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PREFACE
The world's poor and underprivileged are mainly rural. The key asset of rural people, the
indispensable resource for survival strategies and the locus of power, has always been the land.
In consequence, it has become the essential problem of underdevelopment. This land reform is a
main key for my understanding ofrural underdevelopment, to freedom from hunger and to peace.
It is therefore my contention that unless the problem of land is squarely faced, competently
assessed, and its implications successfully incorporated into development strategies, there is little
hope of tackling such underdevelopment.
One cannot, in fact, study land reform and efforts to contain it, in isolation from socio-political
system. Land reform provides the most opportune moments for observing the workings and
reactions of the socio-political system when touched on its raw nerve. A proper study of land
reform provides a rare vantage point from which to watch the whole system coping with
provocation. These and other weighty issues require analysis and evaluation, but make
overwhelmingly difficult any treatment of the subject that is both comprehensive and effective.
The main an:~a ,of focus in this exercise is to examine underlying situations and likely causes and
sources ofland reform, to identifY forces and processes at work, to look at the dramatis personae
and the supporting cast, to sketch in the stage for events and its control system, and to illustrate
these with examples of conjunctures and action. The aim is to probe to the fullest extent that
situations are known or understood by the writer. This study is concerned with pertinence, not
with norm-setting. Lessons, may thereby be drawn, directly and perhaps more firmly.
The vast world canvas with its bewildering contrasts and complications require any practitioner
to put some order onto his/her conception and method ofwork ifhis/her actions are to become
relevant and effective, and not merely a formal response. Exposure to the real problem in situ is
the best education. The writer's experience dictated divorce between diplomatic niceties and ugly
realities; the comfortable conferences which contrasted with the urgent needs of humanity outside;
the deceptions practised by politicians concerning real problems; and the low, if not at times
negative, r~turns for colossal efforts and considerable funds. These and similar goings-on
compelled a profound reappraisal ofpolicies, methods and attitudes and a search for real causes.
This dissertation can be read as a reaction based on experience. It is also a positive attempt to put
the core issues where they belong and an invitation to view matters from where the real dynamic
is generated. The main thrust is that the intensity, direction and effect of that dynamic varies with
prevailing conditions, contending forces and institutional instruments in what in essence is a power
struggle.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My thanks go to many people whose contribution has given me the needed inspiration to
undertake the difficult task of preparing this dissertation. To begin with, I thank my supervisor,
Professor Mike Morris who provided constant support, open exploration and prompted me to
make a necessary brutal excision. I register my gratefulness to my colleagues, for the assistance
they gave me in proofreading and obtaining some of the information and ideas I needed for this










Context and Rationale ·····.······································
Definition of actual problem ··.················
Research Methodology ····································





Chapter Two Land Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Introduction ··········································· 07
2. Influence ofWorld Bank's Paradigm Shift ,........................................ 07
3. The Genesis ofLand Reform ········.············ 09
4. Land Reform Perspectives........................................................................... 10
5. Land Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa ·.··· 11
6. Land Transfer in Kenya............................................................................... 13
6.1 Pre Independence Period............................................................................. 13
6.2 Post Independence ·.···.····· 14
6.3 Lessons from Kenyan Experience................................................................ 15
7. Zimbabwe Resettlement Programme............................................................ 15
7.1 Zimbabwe's Land Reform Blue Print........................................................... 16
8. Relevance to South Africa........................................................................... 17
9. Conclusion.. . ... ...... ..... ... ...... .. . . .. .. .. ... .... .. ........ .... 18
Chapter Three Land Reform in South Africa
1. Introduction............................................................................................... 19
2. ReVIew of 1991 White Paper on Land Reform............................................. 19
2.1 Ownership................................................................................................... 21
2.2 Equity/ Access to land................................................................................. 21
2.3 Bureaucratic Centralisation.......................................................................... 21
2.4 Lack of Integrated Rural Development......................................................... 22
2.5 Institutionalised discouragement of public participation................................ 22
2.6 Comments.................................................................................................... 22
3. The South Mrican Transition: Political Constraints..................................... 23
4. Major aspects of the Land Reform Programme............................................. 24
4. 1 Restitution.. ... ... ... ...... .. .. ...... .. .. .... .. ..... . 24
4.2 Redistribution............................................................................................... 25
4.3 Land Tenure Reform..................................................................................... 25
5. Potential Contradictions and Tensions between Policy Objectives.................. 26
5.1 The Dichotomy ofEquity and Productivity.................................................... 26
5.2 Competing Qualification Criteria................................................................... 26
5.3 A Mockery ofPrivate-Public Partnership....................................................... 27
5.4 What or who is a Household?....................................................................... 27
5.5 Implementation in the Face of Shrinking Resources 28
6.
7.




Chapter Four Policy and Institutional Framework for


























Constitutional Constraints on Land Reform ······ .. ·········
Section 25 : Stumbling Block to Land Reform ·······
Dimensions of Inte~jurisdictionalCooperation .
Constitutional Obligations and Practices: Formal and Informal
Institutions ······························································· .
The Duality ofLocal Government ······························
Asymmetrical relation between Central and Local Government. .
Land Reform: Unfinished Policy ofDecentralization to Local
Government. ······························································ .
Discrepancy between Planning and Budgeting .
Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy .
Reducing the role of Government in the Economy .
GEAR Deficit and Growth Performance ·····
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) ..
Communicative Budgetary Process ··.··················
Institutional Change ·.····················
Accountability , .
Practical Land Reform Challenges in KwaZulu-Natal.. .
The Impact ofPast Policies ··········
The Role of Traditional Institutions .
The Dominant Mode ofLand Reform Intervention: A Centrally Driven
Application-based Approach .
Chaotic Land Controlling System .
Suffocating Bureaucracy .
Fragmentation on Rural Financial Services .



































Market -based Approach Versus Government Interventions : Oxymoron
or Red Herring .
Development Planning: A Trend Towards Decentralisation .
Communicative Land Reform Planning .
Developmental Local Government : Prospects for Integrating Land
Reform ..........................................................................................................
Synoptic Understanding ofDevelopment Planning within Land
RefoTn;J. in KwaZulu-Natal.. ..
Provincial Growth and Development Strategy .















White Paper on Integrated Rural Development. .
Implementation ofDevelopment Planning in KwaZulu-Natal. .
Provincial Planning and Development Planning (PDA) .
Aggregation and desegregation .










Obstacles to implementation of Land


















BriefBackground of Illustrative Case Studies .
Ngotshe Accord: Louwsberg District: Zululand Regional Council. .
Khambi Zulu .
Buthelezi T and Buthelezi J. .
Ntshangase .
Zondo .
Khumalo : Utrecht District: Urnzinyathi Regional Council. .
KwaXamu Mediation Case Project: Vryheid District: Zululand Regional
Council .
Distinct Obstacles to Optimal Land Reform Implementation .
Control and Accountability in the Bureaucracy .
Discrepancy Between Macro and Micro Implementation .
Implications of Constitutional Provisions .
Clarity of Goals and Communication :


















Chapter Seven Policy Consideration for Improving Institutional







Reconciling Fragmentation ofResponsibility for Financing Planning and
Implementation .
Integrating Land Reform Programme within Development Planning
Process...........................................................................................................
Conceptualising Micro-Political Issues Impacting on Institutional
Dimensions and Land Reform Development .
Creation of Interactive Learning Environment. .








1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The essence ofthe land problem in South Mrica is the unequal distribution of resources brought
about by the 1913 Land Act, and the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act. The effects of these
segregationist polices were later exacerbated by apartheid which used pigmentation to deny the
majority of South Africans the right to own or use land. The White Paper on South African Land
Policy (drafted by Department ofLand Affairs and approved by Cabinet in June 1997) responded
by developing a crucial and commendable land policy that is aiming to foster national
reconciliation, stability, growth and development in an equitably sustainable manner (Department
ofLand Affairs, 1997). The realisation ofthis government's vision is more than a simple technical
issue of creating an appropriate institutional framework for its delivery and ordering its
implementation. It is about what the contemporary prevailing orthodoxies of land reform refers
to as rigorous and effective institutional transformation that should focus on power relations
around land and mediating processes of political struggles over land ownership, land access and
land use (Marcus, 1995). Hence, land reform has been identified as one of the development
policies that are central in the transformation of South Africa.
The greatest challenge facing reborn South Africa is to reach common agreement in redressing
the effects of apartheid and other past injustices. South Africa's land reform has an ethical,
economic and social dimension because whilst equity, or equality of opportunity seems to be a
principle that can be easily applied, it requires favouring some interests over others. Hence the
status quo was the consequence of the exclusion of one group by another. Future equality of
opportunity should start by using the present distribution of ownership ofwealth in terms ofland
rights as a point of departure. The principle of equality of opportunity will thus question the
status quo with respect to the distribution of wealth and economic power and, at the very least,
suggest an affirmative action approach to ensure a more equitable starting point. The acid test
should therefore be: is land reform sustainable and will identified communities' overall living
standards be improved by the three land reform programmes?
The land reform policy has three main components: restitution, redistribution and land tenure
reform. The restitution programme is designed to restore land to people who have been
dispossessed; the redistributi~:m programme is aimed at increasing access to land by those too poor
to get land through normal capitalist market forces. This programme is very important to make
sure that there is significant shift in land ownership towards people who were previously landless
and thus providing them with land for residential and productive purposes and the land tenure
reform programme seeks to convert insecure tenure rights of the occupants of communal land
which is nominally owned by the state (Department ofLand Affairs, 1997). These programmes
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are very necessary if the country is to move towards political, social and economic stability. A
daunting but necessary challenge is therefore placed on the shoulders of the bureaucracies to
effectively implement the objectives of this land policy.
Functionaries of the Department ofLand Affairs (DLA) are always advocating that successful
implementation of land reform in South Africa is dependent on more than merely access to land.
The provision ofsupport services, infrastructural and other development programmes, is essential
to improve the quality of life by contributing to poverty alleviation and to economic growth. This
necessitates a constructive partnership between all spheres of government administrations and
cooperative partnership between the state and private sectors. Contrary to this theory, the
practical implementation of land reform is characterised by extensive disjointed coordination
between different government departments, technocratic stringent regulation of land development,
market-based constraints and bureaucratic administrative 'bottle-necks'.
It is against this backdrop that the didactic analysis of this research will be concerned with more
than just puncturing illusions and pointing out how things in practice really work. Instead, it hopes
to place in context the dilemma faced by all practitioners mandated to implement land reform
within a Constitution which is aimed to promote social justice in an institutional framework that
is clouded with confusion. The dilemma is that although the Constitution enjoys full political
support, it is caught between the imperatives for equity and redress which drives national land
reform policy and the dwindling financial resources allocated to the provinces provided for
supportive developmental needs. The ultimate goal is to highlight to the government and in
particular the Kwazulu-Natal Provincial Administration (KZNPA) how these institutional
constraints can be overcome in the process of developing a sustainable and integrated land
reform. Specific focus is placed on unpacking the lack of policy coherence that emanates from
constitutional provisions which places land reform within the national competence whilst making
provincial planning and development a provincial competency.
2. DEFINITION OF ACTUAL PROBLEM
A central theme of the White Paper on South African Land Policy (drafted by Department of
Land Affairs and approved by Cabinet in June 1997) is to translate the government's commitment
to social justice and alleviation of poverty onto a set of concrete land reform and land
development programmes, legislation and procedures. However, the performance of land reform
delivery in KwaZulu-Natal has been slower and oflower quality than was intended. Many studies
that have been commissioned by DLA have identified a range ofinstitutional and technical failings
which need to be addressed. The White Paper principles will remain a dream if national land
reform continu~s to be carved out with scant attention being paid to provincial and local planning
and development variations. Provincial governments and particularly KwaZulu Natal have
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continuously argued that constitutional obligations are inextricably linked with budgetary
provisions. The processes ofbudgeting and prioritisation of land reform projects is done by DLA
and is not prepared in line with provincial or local planning and development budgetary and
legislative provisions.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) created a fundamentally new
legal and institutional environment within which the delivery ofland services must take place. The
Constitution assigned land matters and legislative powers regarding land matters as a competence
of National Government. Political accountability for land affairs lies with the Minister of Land
Affairs. Two serious problems have emerged with this constitutional provision. The first of these
is a systematic tendency of the DLA to bypass provincial and local service providers. Although
such approaches can facilitate fast-track development, they have also served to obviate inter-
sectoral cooperation, local planning and co-ordination ofdevelopment activities. Another problem
arises out ofthe fact that land reform is a centrally driven programme which has had difficulty in
securing the commitment of Provincial and Local Governments. This has resulted in DLA having
to bear exclusive responsibility with its very limited capacity and resources.
The Constitution states that government is constituted by three spheres that are distinctive,
interdependent and interrelated. Although these spheres are governments in their own right, the
Constitution also requires each sphere to observe the principles of co-operative government. This, '
Constitution has laid a fertile ground for developing effective partnerships but the White Paper
on Land Policy has failed to rationally and clearly define roles and responsibilities of each sphere
so as to minimise confusion and maximise effectiveness. The White Paper stipulates that
decentralisation of function and authority to its provincial offices is a necessity for efficient and
effective delivery of land reform. These offices are mandated to negotiate with Provincial and
Local Governments about co-ordinating service delivery and providing complementary
development support to beneficiaries of land reform. These negotiations have been hampered by
the Constitution which confines land matters within the national competency. This has created
a situation where land reform implementation programmes have encountered bottle necks because
Provincial and Local Governments have not been delegated with comprehensive funded mandates.
The KwaZulu Natal Cabinet approved the Provincial and Growth Development Strategy on the
03 July 1996. ~his Strategy committed the provincial administration to a process of development
planning that would result in the social and economic upliftment ofKwaZulu-Natal's population.
The logic ofthe Strategy is to be informed by and inform the development of national policies and
also be premised on a shared responsibility in its formulation and implementation. The existing
vacuum between the constitutional obligation and budgetary provisions triggered the author's
attention as he is directly involved with the formulation of many provincial policies and the co-
ordination of planning and development projects in the Northern Region of this province.
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The reason for focussing on the implementation of land reform is to transfer knowledge to action
by specifically showing how synergy between provincial initiatives and national policies can be
harmonised to p'ositively influence the vision of the Strategy. It is contend~d that the principles
ofco-operative government and intergovernmental relations as enshrined in the Constitution can
be used to effectively implement land reform. Much effort has been made by DLA in preparing
the ground work but their approach lacks effective networking with provincial and local planning
and development initiatives. This target will never be realised within the constitutional turf that
exists in the institutional framework responsible for implementing land reform.
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study has made use of both primary and secondary sources of information. The primary
information was mainly influenced and drawn from empirical experience and intuition about the
implementation ofland reform in the Northern Region ofKwaZulu-Natal (Map 1) . The everyday
life as experienc~d by Department ofLocal Government and Housing (DLGH)-Northern R~gion,
in the interactions with government departments and affected parties in the land reform projects
calls for the need offocussed approach in interpreting and synthesising many facets affecting the
successful implementation of land reform. Basic justification of this approach is provided by the
author's (Director: Land, Planning and Survey - Northern Region) direct involvement in these
processes.
(1) All the existing land reform projects in the Northern region have experienced delays
caused by institutional weaknesses attributed to the difficult terrain of constitutionally-
defined roles regarding the performance of land functions within the framework of the
new Constitution and also in regard of the new land policies of the government.
(2) The Northern Region office is directly involved in the frustrated land reform development
process and also in negotiations of providing complementary development support to
beneficiaries. The implementing agencies have not as ,yet shared a c?herent understanding
oftheir roles and responsibilities. The conflict ridden process of post settlement support
is consuming considerable time and energy of departmental officials in conflict
management.
(3) The transformation process ofRegional Councils and uncertainties associated with unclear
mandates exacerbate the bureaucratic infighting in the land reform delivery process. It is
still not explicitly cle~ who is responsible for what and who is most accountable between
the Department ofLand Affairs and the Regional Councils.
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(4) Officials from this office are part ofthe leading team discussing decentralising of land
reform implementation to the lowest possible level within the Regional Council. The
author is currently identifying the strength of the linkages between institutions involved
in the land reform delivery process. This is done to formulate an institutional design that
identifies an ideal set of institutional relationships for the implementation of land reform.
(5) Three Regional Councils in the Northern Region are in the process of drafting their
development plans. The need for an integrated land reform process and other related
policies are continuously communicated to the participants. One problem that has been
identified is that beneficiaries are not being sufficiently involved or informed in relation to
post settlement support and how should be incorporated into the Regional plans.
(6) The Northern Region office is inextricably linked to the conflict-ridden process of
assigning responsibilities in relation to post settlement support. The Department ofLand
Affairs fulfills its mandate with no reference to provincial planning and budgeting. The
level of provincial/local government involvement in deciding spatial settlements is
miniature and makes a mockery of overall integrated regional development planning.
Review of Documentation
A review of all documentation regarding the land reform projects in Northern region was
undertaken. Minutes ofthe District Committees were used with a provision that individual names
and issues. of confidentiality were not going to be disclosed. Other documents related to the
implement8:tio.n of land claim were accessed from the Department of Land Affairs,
Pietermaritzburg Provincial Offices. The Regional Councils (Umzinyathi, Zululand and
Uthungulu) gave permission to review their correspondence with Department ofLand Affairs with
regard to specific projects within their areas ofjurisdictions.
Group Meetings
The monthly District Meetings held at Regional Councils were used by the author (as the member)
to raise critical issues that were ofrelevance to this exercise. The purpose of the study was clearly
explained to the co-members and it was emphasised that this study was not commissioned by any
government department. The study was undertaken so that other participants in the land reform
implementation could learn from the findings of this study. It was minuted in all meetings that the
author's recommendations will not represent his mother department (Department of Local
Government and Housing) nor the views of the District meetings that he is currently serving.
6
Case Studies
Visits were made to all illustrative case studies. However, no formal questionnaires were used in
collecting data because the authorities felt that the position of the author as he is also serving in
the committees would be compromised. It was strongly suggested that the author should only
conduct informal individual interviews because communities would find it difficult to differentiate
whether the interview was held on government's behalf or on the interviewer's interest.
Secondary Data
The secondary information used included information drawn from land reform publications,
journals, Department ofLand Affairs unpublished documents, Regional Development Plans and
press clippings. The KwaZulu-Natal Development Planning publications were targeted specifically
because KwaZulu-Natal has been at the forefront in introducing a model of integrating different
planning and development legislations.
4. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION
In order to contextualise the problem statement, this dissertation begins with a discussion of land
reform in Sub-Saharan Africa (chapter two) where the origins of land reform are traced with
particular refer~nce to two African countries, that is, Zimbabwe and Kenya. This is followed by
chapter three which is an overview of key land reform programmes in South Africa and closes
by highlighting critical areas of policy considerations. An in-depth analysis of policy and
institutional framework for implementation is extensively covered in chapter four where
problems and prospects for effective implementation is are outlined. Chapter five attempts to
locate the policy and institutional framework of land reform within the development planning
process ofKwaZulu-Natal, with the sole purpose of emphasising the need for an integrated land
reform delivery process in KwaZulu-Natal. Obstacles to effective implementation ofland reform
in KwaZulu-Natal are discussed in chapter six where reference is made to specific illustrative
case studies as experienced in the Northern Region. In the final section (chapter seven) of the
dissertation, specific policy proposals are discussed with an aim of stimulating thinking and
debate about effective institutional development for implementing land reform.
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CHAPTER TWO
LAND REFORM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
1. INTRODUCTION
The heterogeneous structure of land reform in Africa is primarily a result of the political history
ofthe continent. The post-independence Mrican governments inherited the conceptual, and the
major part of the legal framework on land reform from the colonial period. Africa has seen a
series of land reform programmes intending to change the rights and duties underlying tenure.
Most of the programmes have attempted by legal means to privatize and individualize land
holdings, but have failed to carry out effective reform and have suffered from a weak
administrative capacity to see the process through and sustain the system after the reforms have
taken place. Furthermore, they did not recognize the variety of traditionally-based tenure systems
already present in the countries and the security of tenure these can provide.
The social and economic forces of modernization that swept Africa beginning in the late 1960s,
brought fundamental socio-cultural, political, and economic changes that essentially benefitted a
small minority. The literature review reveals that land policy implementation has remained the
same or worsened in terms of organization and function since independence (Ahmed, 1998).
Mabogunje (1992) assessing literature ofland reform in Sub-Saharan Africa, mentioned that little
progress in land reform could also be attributed to the rapid introduction of structural adjustment
programmes that drastically reduced public resources and the role of the state. Economic
liberalization and privatization schemes have led Southern African countries to revise their land
reform policies and to consider land markets as a future strategy for their land policies.
It is worthwhile for South African policy makers to review this Mrican literature so that it can
profit from the experiences ofAfrican countries thereby enhancing their land policy administrative
management efforts. This chapter therefore attempts to explain what makes land policy
development so central to economic, political and social discourse. Kenya and Zimbabwe are used
as case studies to show what mechanisms and processes have been used to initiate and administer
land policy in specific country contexts, and what outcomes have been experienced and whether
beneficiaries received a worthwhile course.
2. INFLUENCE OF WORLD BANK'S PARADIGM SHIFT
Any analysis of land reform which ignores the global political context, the influences of
international donors and how it affects the policy formulation and implementation is fundamentally
flawed (Morah, 1996). Since the beginning of the step-by-step redirection from neoliberalism in
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to poverty (1990), general development policies (1991), the environment (1992), health (1993),
infrastructure (1994), labour market integration (1995), and from planning to market-led growth
(1996). These reports raised fundamental issues about new developments in state-market relations
and the relations between the state and society. It is therefore not surprising that the Bank's 1997
annual development report addresses The State in a Changing World (World Bank, 1997). World
Bank's learning by doing experience has revealed that comparative success and failure in its
economic reform and social-sector programmes depend greatly upon the competence of a state
in policy development and technical proficiency.
The last report differentiates 'market-friendly' approaches from laissez-faire: it deliberately
enhances markets and associated human capital and institutional reform. Human capital is here
understood as the value of the additional lifetime income to society and this is derived from
household economics, from state programmes and from some experiences in labour markets
(Pugh, 1997). The Bank's terminology and its discourse help to define its line of thinking. For
example, South Africa is to be assessed as to whether it has capability, effectiveness, credibility,
useful partnerships, and incentives in its institutional arrangement in order to overcome the cost
ofcompliance (World Bank, 1997). Owing to the possibilities of distortion and bureaucratic self-
interest, compliance is at risk, with bureaucracies taking directions different from those intended
by politicians and electorates. However, the Bank has now relied on both theorists of positive
attitudes to the state as well as on those with cautious or negative attitudes. This most remarkable
development marks the World Bank's first steps to balance its historically strong economics with
some selective politics.
The aim is to improve development performance; this being instrumental for growth and welfare.
That is to say good states, good institutional arrangements and good policies raise social and
economic performance in development. It is argued (Turner and Hulme, 1997) that 'goodness'
depends on bringing the state closer to the people, reducing corruption to insignificance,
developing the range and depth ofthe state's capability of achieving some reasoned redistributive
welfare and having regard for context variations. These variations are very important, and requires
some selective attention because the range of achievement is contingent upon whether particular
states are weak or strong. Stronger states can do large and complex things, whereas a weaker
state should do only what is feasible, with regard to basic priorities. As the World Bank has had
to deal with regimes ofvery different characteristics (democratic, authoritarian, progressive,), it
has tended to avoid the politically contentious by emphasising economic, technical and project
feasibilities.
The South African government should be commended for not fully importing this notion as it has
inherent difficulties because of its propensity to achieve unequal progres~ rather tha~ effective
convergence, largely because institutional change has longer and more difficult histories than some
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relevant economic reforms. One can conclude that World Bank's Development Report 1997 is
a cautious and limited first step to bring more politics into its political economy, although the
economic still dominates. This is significant for policy makers, and challenges them to deepen
their understanding of politics, governance and institutions. If the World Bank is starting to
realise the significance of land reform and view macro-spatial planning as essential for economic
development, then South Mrican land policy will most probably start to feature strongly in the
World Bank's 'development agenda. :
3. THE GENESIS OF LAND REFORM
Land is at the heart ofland reform and is the pivot of power. Rousseau powerfully expressed this
'collective claim from natural law' as follows: "Land is the gift from God, and land property did
not enjoy the same legitimacy as property acquired by labour". In his Social Contract and
Discourses he wrote: "The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself
of saying This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of
civil society" (Offer 1981 :3). The problems associated with effective implementation are those
of human or social relations with respect to control and use of land and access to the accruing
benefits. Land becomes the pivot of power because people depend on it for their vital needs: the
greater the dep,endence, the more strategic becomes control of land and the more p0"o/er it
confers.
Monopoly control ofland may lead to monopoly control of power over people. Institutionalised
control ofland operates through the political system. The reciprocal relationship between the land
system and the political system makes them interdependent; the land system becomes the pillar
ofthe wider socio-economic and political system. The land system is a network of these relations
in institutionalised form. It follows that, whenever those who have no privileged access to land,
especially those who are wronged or oppressed by the system, find it unacceptable, there is no
easy way change that system.
Landowning interests, especially if they are privileged and entrenched, will not give up their
privileges or power unless they are forced to do so. Only an acute conflict and shift in the power·
structure will bring about significant change. This, simply put, is the nature of land reform and the
political economy of reform. Because land has a special role as a means of production while its
use satisfies vital needs, the concept has persisted over centuries, if not millennia, that land is a
free gift of nature and, is therefore, meant for all inhabitants. The eighteenth-century writer,
Jeremy Bentham, in his Principles ofCivil Code suggested that "land was not the gift of God, the
gift ofthe State ... Property was a social construct which was only justified by expediency; what
has been granted could be taken away" (Ibid.p.1). Appropriation ofland for private use i; thus
in some way unnatural and wronging to others. This tenet of land as a free gift of nature is based
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on classical economic concepts and the related moral stand, namely, that land and social functions
cannot be appr9priated for exclusive and selfish use and profit by some at the expense of others.
Land reform is a drastic, planned public intervention aimed at bringing about a new structure of
access to land that is more appropriate to the requirements of the socio-economic and political
system which it supports or with which it is closely linked. Thus land reform inescapably involves
a network ofpower relations and brings into play a vast range of forces. In the context of South
Africa, one can illustrate this distinct perception of land reform. It is viewed as an integral part
ofthe overall socio-economic and political system because it is rests on a structure of access to
land resources in which those resources are concentrated in the hands of a small class of large
owners.
Land reform has become a critical element, even the spearhead, in a complete transformation of
the total socio-political system. The complexity and magnitude ofthe task of an urgent and drastic
transformation is barely within the capacity ofthe government and administrative systell] anc,l also
faces strong\o~position from ~owerful and entrenched landed interests. The real situation'is, of
course, much more complex and varied, but it should be stressed that the basic inequities tend to
worsen as interventions take the form ofan enactment ofa basic land law (or review of an existing
one) modelled on English or French principles (Okoth-Ogendo, 1998) .The seeds, however, are
engendered by the malfunctioning of the government and or institutional system.
4. LAND REFORM PERSPECTIVES
The repertoire ofdevelopment literature encompasses a significant body of theory and philosophy
about land reform. Despite the overwhelming array of recent publications, it is impossible to find
a definition or a concept of land reform that is self-evident and uncontroversial. The wide
variation of social and economic circumstances, political aims and history of land acquisition
makes the definition of land reform difficult. Some might argue that this does not really matter,
• \ , t
because the'strength of a concept lies in its performance (what it does) rather than in its exact
meaning (what it is). Yet definition is important because some land reform policies are not in fact
intended to change the distribution ofland ownership and rural power. For the purposes of this
exercise, land reform is generally accepted to mean the redistribution of property or rights in land
for the benefit of the landless, tenants and farm labourers (Warriner, 1969). This is the narrow
definition but it has received wider acceptance because it reduces land reform to its simplest
element.
Land reform and agrarian reform are often used interchangeably. Agrarian reform, a construct of
the Cold War to counter communist land reform, embraces improvements in both land tenure and
agricultural organisation. Its policy prescriptions urged governments to go beyond redistribution
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by supporting other rural development measures such as extension of services to facilitate the
productive use of the land reallocated. Whilst conceptually sound, a problem with these wider
prescriptions is that they may discourage governments from doing anything until they can do
everything. Thus, land reform pertains to the remodelling of tenure rights and the redistribution
ofland, in directions consistent with the political imperatives underlying the reform. For example,
policies advocating a drastic, planned, public intervention to redistribute land normally invites
strong opposition from landed interests. Another determining factor is budgetary impediments,
which distract from more feasible evolutionary policies aimed at improving access and security
of tenure (Adams, 1995).
5. LAND REFORM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Questions have been raised regarding land reform experiences in Africa and how they might
inform post-apartheid rural transformation. The need to restructure access, ownership and use of
rural land in post-apartheid South Africa encouraged policy makers to consider viable rural
development models from the international and in particular African experience (Masilela and
Weiner, 1996). An approach in this exercise investigates the experiences of those African
countries that have histories and socio-political structures which have significant parallels with
those of South Africa and from which some lessons can be learned and imported. Kenya and
Zimbabwe are important case studies because these countries have a similar agrarian history
characterised by the dominance ofwhite settler farming and the existence of severely constrained
African reserves. (Haze1wood, 1985 and Weiner 1988).
Although th~re are many impqrtant areas ofdifference between South Africa and other countries,
the common historical features serve as a strong base for drawing similarities. These are notably
the strict division between land occupied by whites and that available to Africans; the striking
contrasts between the contrived socially engineered African areas with their densely populated
and over-farmed character and the sparsely settled and underutilised white areas; the
disproportionate percentage of the prime land owned almost exclusively by whites; the unequal
provision of support services in favour of whites.
Kenya and Zimbabwe are among those countries that perceived land reform as a crucial
mechanism for achieving production efficiency and equity in distribution of agricultural resources.
However, the majority ofland reform policies effectively failed to achieve their optimum potential
and fulfil socio-economic and political expectations (UF Research, 1995). On the contrary, these
countries have entrenched the success of commercial white farmers while ensuring that most




In Kenya and Zimbabwe, the struggle for land has been a major factor in post-independence
development. Decisions about the ownership and distribution of land have had a fundamental
impact on the social structure and political economic paths chosen by their governments after
independence. Initial enthusiasm was followed by substantial changes in the government attitudes
and adoption ofboth neo-classical and neo-marxist approaches to resolve the land question. This
inconsistent and unclear development path became apparent with the decollectivisation and
\ ,
privatisation in the former socialist economies and the increasing pressure from the international
donors for adoption ofstructural adjustment policies. Important agents in the development scene,
such as the Bretton Woods institutions, advocated a resurgence of the market and a reduction in
state control. Countries were expected to demonstrate their commitments to controlling inflation
and reducing of the balance of payments deficit through the introduction of stabilisation
programmes. Tight monetary policies were introduced which resulted in the reduction of public-
sector expenditure which included cutting subsidies. South Africa is no exception given that the
majority rule government has, in the face of racially skewed land ownership introduced market-
based measures to achieve land distribution in favour of blacks.
It is crucial for policy makers to accept that land reform policy is extremely value-loaded. Since
the 1980's the international institutions and the donor community have increasingly devoted time
and effort towards gaining universal acceptance for the liberal-democratic and free market model
which is based on the assumption that democratic politics and slim, efficient and ac~ountable
public bureaucracy are not simply desirable, but also necessary for a thriving free market economy
and vice versa. Ideology is the driving force behind much development thinking, but it is not
always a good master. The confrontation between ideologically motivated ideas and real life
situations convincingly demonstrates the limitations ofideologically-driven approaches. Structural
adjustments in the global economy and the international political order have resulted in Africa's
increased marginalisation and impoverishment. Furthermore, the African state and civil society
are moulded by a rather peculiar set of forces which makes it hard to compare them with, for
example, South-east Asian states (Stren, 1992).
The key lesson for South Africa is the need for carefully conceptualized and coherent land reform
policies. The challenge is to define appropriate roles and responsibilities in specific situations for
the actors involved, notably the public sector (at different levels), the private sector and social,
non-goveITIII:J.ental sectors. However this does not advocate universal land reform formula~ that
. \ ' .
can be seen as the panacea for the land question. From the development perspective, land reform
should be seen as one input into a national process which will hopefully empower policy makers
to freely and consistently formulate approaches consistent with current national goals. For policy
makers it is critical to understand the extent to which the state should intervene in land reform
programmes and to know whether decisions to proceed with land reform are inherently political.
An increased awareness of the crucial role of politics is needed, one that must be seen as the
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framework within which plans are to be designed and implemented. An accurate political analysis
should identify different kinds ofvested interests (the commercial elite, the central go,:,e~ent,
the administ;ation) to ascertain'how they influence decision making (formally and informally) and
to assess how the excluded segments ofsociety could participate in and be mobilised by the land
reform process. Furthermore, the outcome of policy reform is to a large extent dependent on the
commitment of those who are in power as well as on the disposition of government officials
(Batley, 1994). For example, when growing landlessness, chronic indebtedness and evictions o.f
tenants threaten stability, the state should intervene to regulate ownership rights, sometimes with
the tacit agreement of landowners seeking to prevent land invasions.
6. LAND TRANSFER IN KENYA
Land ownership continues to be a key problem in contemporary Kenya. Lack of non-farm
employment and the individualization oflegal title led to more unequitable distribution of incomes
and did not afford equal respect to the different rights and interests in land. The government
engaged in a"land reform process that was to be achieved without disrupting existing operations.
The land hunger of the Mricans had to be assuaged within programmes which prevented the
exodus of white farmers in the face of the advancing reforms. The implication of this approach
was government paralysis (especially after independence) in that the state failed to achieve an
equitable division ofland as well as protect land rights which adversely effected the poor and has
been a source of some fierce land disputes in recent years (Roth, 1994).
6.1 Pre Independence Period
The foundations for land reform in Kenya were laid in the 1950's during the Mau-Mau period.
Problems in the African reserves were acute and similar in pattern to those in the South African
'Native' reserves, which later became bantustans: the land was over-cropped, over-grazed and
eroded and land that was fertile and ofhigh potential was often fragmented into tiny plots because
of Mricans limited access to the land, as well as the traditional tenure and succession systems.
Most the 'whit~' land, an area ofover 3 million hectares, was not used to its full capacity and lay
I
idle (Hazlewood, 1985). Many Commissions that were appointed in an effort to reduce the
pressure for African access to white 'Scheduled Areas' failed to recognise the rights of the poor
to have security of access to land. The 1954 Swynnerton Commission brought about change in
Mrican agriculture by the introduction of individual tenure and the cultivation of profitable
exports. It argued for the eventual concentration of land in the hands of the most efficient
producers and anticipated the exodus of surplus population and its absorption into industry or
as labour for the new landed class. Recommendations of this Commission are still being
implemented in the tribal areas or reserves and are having a profound impact on Kenya's political
economy. The better-off segments ofrural society as well as urban residents aspiring to own rural




further landlessness and a polarization ofthe rural classes since land was concentrated in the hands
of the efficient farmers, a minority, and inevitably a rich minority.
The 1955 Royal East Mrican Commission compounded the problem by adopting a principle of
promoting commercial agriculture and private enterprise through the transfer of land from white
to black farmers, and in the case of African land holdings, consolidation, adjudication and
registration of title, thus abandoning the tribal approach to land ownership. One effect of this
reform was the transformation of land into a commodity that could be owned initially by clans,
then families and eventually by individuals and could be sold without reference to traditional
norms. This gave rise to a class of landless people, especially women. Land reform in Kenya, as
it favoured men against women, also downplayed the status and role of women as the actual
utilisers of land. Further, it was designed for a sedentary mode of agriculture and served to
marginalise pastoral communities which lost access to key land resources during droughts (Nthia
Njeru, 1991)
6.2 Post Independence
In the first 10 to 15 years after Kenya's independence in 1963, the government was occupied with
the settlement ofAfricans on high potential land alienated from Africans in the early years of the
century. The main focus of this policy was the transfer of land to allow for the continuation of
large scale farming units leased to suitable tenants. This policy was based on the following
principles: the redistribution of land and wealth to Africans; redistribution without a loss in
productivity; the maintenance of a large farm sector and payment by settlers for land they
acquired. Whereas it was accepted that the redistribution of wealth and income was to favour
Mricans, development was the overriding principle. Land transfer was necessary to defuse the
time-bomb ofl~dlessness but on a scale no larger than was needed to prevent political upheaval.
Redistribution was to be achieved without a fall in productivity and without disrupting existing
operations. The land hunger of the Africans had to be assuaged within programmes which
prevented the exodus of white farmers in the face of the advancing reforms. Also new African
farmers had to be capable ofthe same level of output (UP Research, 1993). This implies that the
favoured tenants were those with farming experience who had managed to accumulate some
capital already. Thus it was not those who came to be called 'the absolute landless' and who had
given the political impetus to settlement who were the beneficiaries of most of the programmes.
Another school of thought also cites bureaucratic muddles as another major contributor in the
unsuccessful implementation of land reform in Kenya. The Ministry of Agriculture operated
independently of the Ministry ofLands and Settlement. This lack of co-ordination coupled with
inefficient and technically inadequate management made it difficult for farmers to achieve target
incomes. It so~n became evidept that large scale farming was less productive, hence the principle
became less convincing (Hazlewood, 1985). Apart from agricultural farm holders, squatters on
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farms and pastoralists, all of whom have been hit hard by evictions and dispossession, there are
other marginalised groupings within Kenyan society whose needs also have to be urgently dealt
with in the land reform process. For women, basic inequities with respect to property rights and
access to land inhibit their livelihood security. Although changes in the succession laws should
enable women to buy and sell land in their own names, matrimonial property still remains subject
to dominant patriarchal tendencies in customary family laws.
6.3 Les~ons From Kenyan Experience
A critical lesson that features prominently from Kenyan experience is that the poorest of the poor,
many ofwhom have good farming skills, did not benefit from the land reform process and their
productive potential was unrealised because of a discourse that wrongly assumed that ability to
pay is an indication of ability to farm.
(a) The Kenyan experience has shown that farms should not be larger than can be worked by
a family, bearing in mind those members who engage in employment off the land and the
extent to which landless workers can be employed. The extent of land transfer should
therefore not be limited by a belief in the need to maintain a large-farm sector, except
where this is necessary under relevant conditions.
(b) The importance ofdeveloping policy measures that adopt a pluralist approach to ensure
where there is scope for parallel systems of modem and customary tenure within different
areas. This emphasises ~he view that developers, politicians and planners need a clear and
accurate understanding of the situation, not broad unsubstantiated assumptions.
(c) Priority be given towards ensuring the access and ownership rights of women, and there
is a need for a comprehensive land rights process that would review the needs of
agricultural and pastoral women.
(d) It shows how important it is for Kenyan society and policy formulators to recognise the
rights ofthe poor to have security ofaccess to land as land is their livelihood asset. Hence
the urgent need for a wider awareness of land rights, support for legal authority and a
well informed leadership knowledgeable about the needs of poor communities.
7. ZIMBABWE'S RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME
Large parts of rural Zimbabwe had been ravaged by almost two decades of guerilla insurgency
and counter-i~surgency when that country finally attained independence on 18 April 1980. The
new government was confronted with the problem of inequitable distrjbution of productive
resources between racial groups, particularly land. A numerically small white commercial farming
sector (approximately 6 000) controlled over 15,4 million hectares of mostly the best land. In
addition, commercial farmers were well capitalised and benefited from extension credit, ,
marketing and infrastructural facilities. In contrast, the smallholder peasant farming sector
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(communal areas) supported about 800 000 families suffering from poor access to natural
resources, environmental degradation, low and very variable rainfall, poor social and physical
infrastructure (jl1d limited offfarm employment opportunities (Bush, Rand Cliffe, L. 1984).. \
The land question was one of the major grievances behind the liberation struggle. From the
founding ofRhodesia in 1890 onwards, successive colonial regimes sought to enforce a system
of racial segregation with the apportionment of land by race as its cornerstone. After
independence, the government announced plans to settle some 18 000 households over five years.
The following year it multiplied this target threefold to 54 000 families; and in March 1982, this
figure had trebled once again, to reach the famous 162000 households which it was hoped would
be settled as early as 1984. However, fourteen years on, the targets have still not been reached.
The strategies of achieving these targets were based on the inherited development planning
process that the government found itselfunable to alter significantly (Gwebu, 1991) . Weiner and
Levin (1993) mentioned that the Rhodesian technicism permeated the colonial civil service and
the institutions of newly independent Zimbabwe and was a historical continuation of a purposive
rational planning paradigm.
7.1 Zimbabwe's Land Reform Blue Print
The resettlement programme operationalised four settlement models which were designed to
facilitate standardisation in the planning process. Model A, which currently accounts for over 90
per cent of all resettled households, provided for arable land allocations of five hectares per
family and grazing rights on communal pastures ofup to 15 livestock units. It envisaged individual
family homesteads and arable holdings, with communal grazing and nucleated villages. Model B
schemes were designed as producer cooperatives and were assumed to be prototype models for
the socialist transformation of agricultures. This model received hostile reception from the very
influential emerging black elite. This group assiduously lobbied government to slow down
resettlement on the grounds that undermining white confidence would have dire economic
consequences. Model C had the same characteristics as Model A, except that it revolved around
a core state-owned estate providing services while settlers reciprocated with labour. They could
also be out-growers to the core estate. Finally, Model D, unlike the other three models, was
developed as a cattle-based scheme designed to promote the optimal use of semi-arid lands with
limited dry-land arable potential. This model was intended to permit controlled periodic grazing
by livestock from adjacent communal areas ( Government ofZimbabwe, 1984).
This blueprint approach invited criticisms from many observers and analysts. Three widespread
criticisms are: poor agricultural performance; a seriously flawed land allocation process; and
bureaucratic state control which undermined other rural development institutions. The third pillar
ofthe failure thesis stipulates that Zimbabwean resettlement was too statist and dependent on top-
down rural development institutions. This prescribed approach was successful in reaching many
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people who historically were socially and spatially isolated and did so as rapidly as possible.
However, these development initiatives were also associated with attempts to consolidate the
ruling party by allocating productive land to those who voted for it whilst 'outsiders' were
located in places where the government perceived that it was politically weak (Alexander, 1991).
The Zimbabwean government therefore failed to articulate a comprehensive rural land reform
programme in which the main development activities were linked to genuine participation by local
communities in the restructuring process.
The top-down directive changing land allocation authority precipitated a struggle with some chiefs
and their patrons and alienated many people. Land reform and resettlement became a technical
exercise for planners. Recipients were to play by the rules that resettlement officers articulated
at the local level (Masilela and Weiner, 1996). These problems associated with statism and
bureaucratisation do not legitimise a neo-liberalland reallocation process as articulated by the
policy makers associated with the World Bank's agricultural mission to South Africa. The
Kenyan example has shown that market driven reform often strengthens the political and
economic position of the emerging black bureaucratic bourgeoisie. A critical factor often
overlooked by neo-liberal analysis is the pervasive nature of the purposive rationality that
characterised the colonial state and remains the operational paradigm of centralised institutions
in post liberation periods. Cousins and Robins (1993) in their analysis ofZimbabwean institutions
concluded that those who work for state institutions are trained and socialized into the language
of goals, policies, programmes and plans. This approach (as generally referred to as
'comprehensive approach') has the tendency to achieve goals that alienate and are far removed
from the genuine concerns of the people being planned for.
8. RELEVANCE TO SOUTH AFRICA
The experience ofZimbabwe's resettlement planning provides lessons that are very pertinent to
contemporary debates on the appropriate institutional framework for implementing land reform
in South Africa. In short, the Zimbabwean government inherited an approach to planning that laid
the foundations for planning principles and procedures that still apply today (Masilela and Weiner,
1996) but also the centralised institutions socialised in the exercise of power through purposive
rational action. As a result, the resettlement exercise became over-bureaucratised around the
production of specific physical land use plans that used the same methods as the former regime.
Though there may have been a changing of the guard in South Africa, the heritage ofpurposive
rational action is alive and well. The whole implementation programme of land reform is still
constituted in the comfort of planning offices with little regard for developing local institutional
capacity and allowing political and sodo-economic variations at the local level. Consequently,
many people in rural areas still have difficulty differentiating between the actions of their new
government and those of the past regime.
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Analysing Zimbabwe's resettlement programme is useful for policy makers in South Mrica. It is
important, however, not to homogenise the resettlement experience as there is a significant social
and spatial variation in household performance. The need for an open minded approach in dealing
with land reform also highlights the need for greater flexibility in developing and implementing
land reforms. People in communities have knowledge that is fundamental to the rural land use
planning process. The acceptance of the concept that the poorest members of the community are
inferior farmers, which is then conceptually connected to the belief that households receiving land
should pay a significant portion of its market price is a dangerous argument when applied in South
Mrica. In the same vein, the reification of the market as the most efficient allocator of rural
resources has important locational and political consequences for South Africa. Local people do
have skills and knowledge pertaining to their areas and a predetermined planning approach makes
it difficult for the comminutes to fully participate in the process, thus making the whole
implementation programme a mere mockery of the concept of participation.
CONCLUSION
It has been discussed in this chapter that the persistence of a technicist planning culture within the
inherited central institutions retards the capacity for the programmes to address local problems
adequately and alienates many rural communities. The failures of rational planning approaches will
not be blamed on the planning itselfnor the inherited bureaucratic structures and procedures but
on the ruling government. An alternative land reform approach conducive to enhancing the full
participation of local communities should be based on the development of a truly participatory
process of land use planning. Communities have a store of valuable local knowledge that is
waiting to be tapped and a strong political consciousness, despite the historical weakness of rural
organisation. Participation however, must not be a legitimisation of top-down policy and project
development but genuinely popular and community based. One pertinent question following this
line of thought is whether the South African constitution is geared towards welcoming local




LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA
1. INTRODUCTION
The move towards democracy in South Africa has been characterised by an emphasis on
reconciliation. This is demonstrated in the protracted period of negotiation leading to the new
constitution ( Act 106 of 1996 ), with its emphasis on seeking consensus and reconciliation, the
Government ofNational Unity, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the role President
Mandela continues to play in promoting reconciliation. One of the areas in which this move
toward reconciliation is likely to be challenged is that of land reform, where initiatives to redress
the effects of apartheid must confront the historically unequal allocation of land among the race
groups. The government outlined its vision for land reform through a White Paper which was
released in March 1997 where it provides a fairly detailed policy statement covering where the
government is prepared to go with the land question (Department of Land Affairs, 1997).
However, it is not clear whether or not the land reform programme will be able to pursue its goals
ofdistributive justice and reconciliation without in the process reinforcing the very problems of
inequality, competition and conflict that it seeks to overcome. To pursue this justice and
reconciliation, it is the contention of this dissertation that a concerted effort should be made to
understand the political realities of implementation and bureaucratic delays experienced in the land
reform process.
This chapter identifies a variety of political compromises that have constrained meaningful
land reform. These are essentially linked to the balance of political forces as they manifested
themselves in the process of democratic transformation and are expressed in the nature of the
political transition itself, as well as in the character of local government, the role of civil
society, the constitution of the new government and its bureaucracies. Points of departure
include an analysis of influences of the 1991 White Paper on Land Reform prepared by the
former regime and analysing the extent of deviation of the development path from the 1996
White Paper o~ South Mrican Land Policy. It is argued in this chapter that the current land
policy needs to be realistic about the context of social relations within which the programme
takes place. An attempt is made to show that policy objectives and the institutional framework
are contradictory. It closes by highlighting and summarising constrains on meeting the stated
objectives ofland reform.
2. REVIEW OF 1991 WHITE PAPER ON LAND REFORM
Over the past century a particular colonial vision has been carved out by successive white
minority governments, with the backing legislation. The 1913 and 1936 Land Acts fragmented
South African rural regions into racially defined land parcels within each ofwhich control over
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land - control over access, utilisation and exchange was restricted to a racially defined
population groups (Bekker, Cross and Evan, 1991). This legislation made it impossible for
black people to acquire legal rights to land in most of the country. They generated social
dislocation and impoverishment on an awesome scale for the majority of South Africans.
The 1991 White Paper proposed to repeal discriminatory legislations and to supplant the
underlying philosophy of those Acts with a new policy framework. The long term aims of the
1991 White Paper include
access to, and security in, land for the disadvantaged majority of the South Mrican
population, including deracialising access to land;
individual title to land and a land market;
viable economic land use and also conservation of land and
a uniform state system of land registration and transfer.
The contentious ideological positions of the previous government and its practices of
restricting popular participation came out quite strongly in the process of analysing the 1991
White Paper by many scholars. Many contestable assertions were made about private
property, free market protection of individual rights and ethnic traditional, tribal natural
communities. Claassens and Budlender (1991) contended that the White Paper represented a
minimal ameliorative reform package to remove legal structures which had either become
obsolete or which impeded policy and structural socio-economic trends. They mentioned that
the White Paper was designed to protect and entrench white privilege and rights which were
built up through systematic discrimination.
Another prevailing feature was the couching of solutions to land issues in terms of the
language of, deyelopment which were made in an attempt to cast land policy within the
acceptable international mould. While it proposed important goals in regard to equity on the
land, the actual policy provisions could be criticised as falling far short of providing what it
was advocating. The White Paper did not begin to live up to the explicitly stated promise that
'land reform should be dealt with fundamentally and comprehensively'. There was a
considerable discrepancy between the actual implementing thrust of the proposed legislation
and the expressed aims of the policy statement. The accompanying bills appeared to be
expressing a relatively conservative line which were intended to implement rural apartheid at
the least cost to white interests. The limitation of their approach were illustrated by
Ferguson's comment on the development apparatus as an 'anti-politics machine, depoliticising
everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, all the white
performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operations of expanding
bureaucratic state power' (Ferguson, 1990: xv).
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2.1 Ownership
The 1991 White Paper in its first page stated that "Private ownership ofland, including
agricultural land, is a cornerstone ofthe Government's land policy. This is in keeping with
the Government's opposition to any form ofredistribution ofagricultural land, whether by
confiscation, nationalisation or expropriation ... a programme for the restoration ofland to
individuals and communities who were forced to give up their land on account ofpast
policies or other historical reasons would not be feasible" ( White Paper, 1991: 1). This
statement is the clear standpoint of the previous government and how it prepared itself to
reinforce the definitive objective of entrenching and perpetuating land ownership patterns and
thereby protecting its'constituency'. This policy document advocated an unfettered free
market with minimal state intervention to redress the existing inequalities. It aimed to preserve
the status quo with regard to white landholding whilst it did not resolve problems of land
hunger because it ignored the inter-relation between commercial agriculture and petty
commodity production as well as white monopoly and black dispossession.
2.2 Equity/Access to land
The government strategy was geared towards promoting general economic use of land
through giving priority to the development of individual title and a market in land. It stated
that "Provision is made for the continued use ofland as a multi-purpose commodity and a
productive asset, but without the racial restrictions. Private ownership is broadened and also
extended to land in respect ofwhich it was preViously not available" (White Paper, 1991).
This strategy 'fas aimed at developing individual title and a land market, with the goal of
promoting economic land use ahead of the first aim, that of access to and security in land for
the previously disadvantaged communities. It is supported that land may be a multi-purpose
commodity and productive asset but it also served as a fundamental source of security against
the ravages of the policies and practices of apartheid which generated successive means of
destitution and impoverishment. This illusion reduced land relations to an obtuse economism
which placed the free market at the centre of distribution and meted out inequalities by an
allegedly neutral force that was held to be just, unavoidable and inherently fair.
2.3 Bureaucratic Centralisation
Implementation of the land reform was to be based on a centralised decision making process
where all decisions were in the hands ofministers and their senior officials. Little provision (if
there was any) was made for community participation in managing their own initiatives. A
single state authority made the implementation of land reform to be centralised and technical
in nature without an adequate local institutional base. Enormous discretion was left with the
relevant Minister and with the bureaucracy over both land administration and land purchase.
For instance, obtaining final title to land in a settlement scheme depended on approval by the
Minister or his representative. This centrally prescribed government restrictions on access and
22
utilisation ofland was seen as demoralising and demeaning to a rural community (De Klerk,
1991). It is clear that it is important that state administration should be decentralised and be
participative so that all the initiatives can be accepted by the beneficiaries.
2.4 Lack of Integrated Rural Development
The framework for socio-economic upliftment of rural communities was constructed on the
shallow foundations of privatising land access within the reserves and the promotion of
freehold farmer settlement schemes (Marcus, 1991). This line of thinking was flawed because
it did not place land reform within the rural community by relating it to household survival
strategies. The proposed settlement schemes viewed rural development as essentially
agricultural in nature and ignored the thriving and diverse forms of 'off farm' economic
enterprise. An effective strategy must encompass both urban wages and part-time rural
agriculture, which also brings in the informal sector. In fact what was missing from the state
was a realistic political and economic vision for the future of rural South Africa. That is, a new
paradigm for rural restructuring, one which can generate a dynamic rural economy able to
provide fair land access and a just living environment for all.
2.5 Institutionalised discouragement of public participation
Apart from the fact that the whole process ofdrafting the 1991 White Paper occurred without
the participation or consultation with organisations representing African interests, there was a
systematic mechanism of discouraging participation in the implementation process. A classical
example is reflected in the promotion of freehold farmer settlement schemes. These schemes
were laid out, divided into farming units and developed under ministerial supervision and
allocated on the advice of a committee experts (Marcus, 1991). This centrist and technist
approach which was gave administrators powers in deciding which families shall be allowed
entry to different.schemes deprived rural communities of a basic right of participation in the
allocation process. It proved to be difficult to promote a purposeful and self-reliant
communities scheme, since it was 'foreign' driven. This was consistent with a long established
legislative approach which acted distinctly, differentially and partially against the land interests
of Africans. In fact it made black people objects of administrative decisions which was one of
the classic hallmarks of apartheid and colonial rule.
2.6 COMMENTS
The appropriateness of the policies of this 1991 White Paper was highly questionable,
particularly at a time when South Africa was entering a new political dispensation. However, it
succeeded in preserving racially sectional interests by entrenching the notion of a free market
approach and reinforcing the ahistorism of prevailing approaches to land reform by denying
the need for redressing the past wrongs. The condemnation of this policy document was
echoed by many practitioners but the very same scholars have also agreed that experience with
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land reform elsewhere in Africa has shown that efforts to redistribute land to the
'disadvantaged' have tended to reinforce existing forms of inequality, and given rise to new
dimensions of inequality, within beneficiaries (Hall, 1998). Many authors have found it easy to
define what was wrong with the past and slightly less easy to define a future vision, but when
it came to specifying how the vision was to be achieved in precise terms, great difficulties
were encountered. The gap between vision and reality is a regular and patterned trend in land
reform programmes. It appears to be a systematic problem. The extent of the disjuncture
between aim and effect cannot be explained merely as shortfall from projected targets but must
be understood as a failure of the policy itself The questions this raises are: will this happen in
the new South Africa, if so why, and in what ways could this be avoided?
3. THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSITION: POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
The inheritance of apartheid and the political compromises that brought it to an end have
shaped and constrained the land reform programme. Critics of the new government
characterise it as a minimalist land reform, pointing to the compromises which were agreed in
the negotiations preceding the 1994 elections. These saw the inclusion of a Property Clause in
the new Constitution which limits the powers ofgovernment to expropriate land and limiting
restitution to those cases which occurred after 1913. Another restraining factor was the
adoption of a market-based programme of redistribution which some assert will fail to address
the land needs of the poor and marginalised (Levin and Weiner, 1997). The preservation of
landholding with regard to large commercial farms, the release of land through the willing-
buyer/willing-seller market-based land transfer process, which in Zimbabwe and Kenya limited
black 'disadvantaged' communities' access to good arable land, will continue to happen as it
was outlined in the 1991 White Paper. These compromises have constrained the state by
limiting its interventionist role in redistributing land to those in need.
This means that the effectiveness of land reform will depend on the efficacy of the rights-based
laws. The resultant situation is that white farmers are going to continue controlling the bulk of
productive natural resources. It is starting to be clear that the politics ofmarket-led land
reform will increase conflict over scarce land, infrastructure and this will paralyse the state in
its endeavour to restructure grand apartheid land use patterns (Christiansen, 1993). The
discourse within South African land policy perpetuates the notion that strong state
intervention is a problem and market-based resource allocation is the solution. This means that
for the majority of the rural population much will depend on the efficacy of the rights-based
laws and programmes currently being enacted and implemented. Policies that are born out of
this discursive framework are going to entrench the neo-apartheid geographies that are already
emerging.
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From a comparative perspective, it is recognised that this is but the first round of land reform
in this country. Looking from experiences of other African countries (such as Kenya and
Zimbabwe) one can see that land reform seldom is accomplished in one try. It emerges on the
political agenda as a result ofwidespread landlessness and insecurity among the population as
a whole where access to the land is marked by historical legacies of inequality. Land reform
will continue to re-emerge over time as an important political issue for as long as large
numbers of the poor reside in rural areas in conditions of poverty and extreme inequality. The
most important and positive point of emphasis is that land reform in this country is being
carried out by a government that is wholly committed to political, social and economic
transformation. The success so far in getting land reform up and running in South Mrica,
despite enormous obstacles, has been due to the intense political commitment of the highest
level ofgovernment. However, the measure of relevance of the reform would be its ability to
redress recognised national problems and issues.
The Minister ofLand Affairs is continuing to listen to the critics of the land policy on the basis
of the spirit of constructive criticism. It is accepted that South Africa's post apartheid
government did embark on a wide-ranging and ambitious programme of land reform, designed
to redress the legacy of decades of dispossession, racially defined and discriminatory legal
frameworks and deep rural poverty (Cousins, 1997). One of the primary aims of the South
African government's land reform programme is to contribute towards reconciliation by
addressing the injustices and inequalities of past land allocation. It is therefore central to the
new government's commitment to transform the lives of the large proportion of the population
who live in the rural areas in conditions of poverty as a direct result of the past apartheid
regIme.
4. MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE LAND REFORM PROGRAMME
The three principal components ofland reform are a market-assisted redistribution
programme, restitution of land to people who were dispossessed by racially discriminatory
legislation and a tenure reform programme aimed at creating tenure security within a variety of
tenure systems.
4.1. RESTITUTION
Like indigenous land claims in other parts of the world, restitution claims turn around
fundamental issues of historical injustice and are highly political in character. The Restitution
ofLand Rights Act of 1994 (Act 22 of 1994) provides priority treatment for those who lqst
their land after 1913 as a result of discriminatory legislation and who were not fairly
compensated. This includes people expelled from 'black spots' and people moved as a result
of the Group Areas Act. Where feasible, the state will restore the original inhabitants to their
land. Where it is not feasible, the state will provide 'just and equitable compensation' (op cit:
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39). Applicants for restitution will enjoy priority treatment, as will their submissions to the
Land Claims Court, which has been established to adjudicate on land disputes. The slow
progress in meeting restitution claims is related to the very lengthy and detailed work carried
out by the Commission. Once claims reach the court they are likely to be bogged down for
years (DLA, 1997).
4.2 REDISTRIBUTION
The purpose of the land redistribution programme is to provide the poor with access to land
for residential and productive purposes in order to improve their livelihoods and is intended
for those who do not qualify for restitution. Redistribution is to assist the poor, labour tenants,
farm workers, women as well as emergent farmers' (op cit: 25). The government envisages a
facilitative role for itself, and a market-assisted approach as the principal mechanism for
transferring land. This is based on the premise ofwilling-buyer/willing-seller where the state
makes available a once-offgrant of R15 000 to individual households and by implication
encouraging people to club together so that they can raise enough money to purchase the
identified land.
Pilot projects that have been lodged in KwaZulu Natal raise a number of unanswered
questions: who is to decide which people get access to what land on what terms for which
purpose? The means of answering these questions are rarely available from the current
redistribution paradigm. Any answer is subject to the perils of prediction. Perhaps at the very
least, one could assert that redistribution is not occurring form the 'haves' to the 'havenots',
but is funded from public revenues spent by the government on beneficiaries in the context of
a (very imperfect) market transaction.
4.3 LAND TENURE REFORM
The land tenure reform programme is trying to create new laws which will recognise and
protect the different ways in which people hold land. The tenure issues seem to be becoming
unstable and contentious in black rural areas because there are vocal demands for clear forms
of individual title, on the one hand, and on the other demands for communally controlled land.
The government therefore intends not prescribing land tenure system for various communities.
Instead it wants to establish a unitary system of rights within a diversity of tenure forms but
which also eliminates land holdings based on permits (op cit: 43). The rights-base approach
also involves the upgrading of current de facto relationships to land to formal legal rights to
land. One cannot opine strong arguments about this programme because several initiatives are
currently being tested. However, it would be naive not to suspect that the introduction of
unfettered land markets into rural communities could lead to increased landlessness and
poverty.
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5. POTENTIAL CONTRADICTIONS AND TENSIONS BETWEEN POLICY
OBJECTIVES
The potentially contradictory process of engendering inequality while seeking to achieve
distributive justice and reconciliation, makes it inevitable to examine the objectives set out in
the White Paper and how they relate to each other.
5.1 The Dichotomy of Equity and Productivity
Equity and productivity become conflicting objectives in the absence of any rationale for how
equity might lead to productivity or vice versa. The policy states that 'equity is aimed at
achieving a better quality oflife for the most disadvantaged' (op cit: 7) and supports access to
land for the landless poor, including women. The productivity objective on the other hand
aims to transform the agrarian structure by supporting the emergence of a viable new sector of
black commercial farmers (op cit: 13). Although in principle these may not be mutually
exclusive objectives, Kenyan experience showed that they may prove to be antagoni~tic in
practice.
The rationale for equity is premised on arguments about social justice, while the rationale for
productivity is grounded on assumptions about growth in the rural economy being brought
about by the emergence of entrepreneurial black farmers in commercial agriculture. There
appears to be no causal link between the two. The dualism of objectives within the policy is
mirrored by the divide among role players in the land reform, between 'welfarists' and
'productionists'. These have been used as derogatory terms used to denote, on the one hand,
an unrealistic, irrational and romantic pursuit of social justice, and on the other, a hard-nosed
economistic denial of the necessity to address social justice. This dichotomisation of the
objectives of land reform is both misleading and destructive because it reflects a flawed
understanding of equity as inimical to productivity.
5.2. Competing Qualification Criteria
The policy mentions that "priority will be given to the marginalised and the needs of women in
particular" but also placing a condition that" priority will be given to cases where the
institutional capacity exists to implement quickly and effectively" (op cit: 28). The latter
priority criterion is no more than a glossy statement, and incongruous to say the least. These
criteria are not necessarily compatible with each other. The marginalised and women in need
are precisely those who are last to know about available opportunities and mechanisms to
lodge claims. One fails to follow the logic of starting to use institutional capacity as the
criterion knowing very well that rural local government structures are weak or non-existent
and largely oppressive to women. The marginalised are not likely to predominate among those
whose projects can be implemented quickly and effectively, or to provide leadership to
claimant groups. By default, Hall (1998) argues, those who already have resources,
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particularly political and commercial contacts will win out every time. While the commitment
to equity is overstated, the need for land reform to deliver speedy and tangible results is likely
to override this commitment in practice.
5.3 A Mockery of Private-Public Partnership
As anticipated by De Klerk (1991), market-based redistribution requires that beneficiaries have
some money and this means that" as a rule disadvantaged will be excluded". The result of the
imminent contradictions and tensions within policy objectives and beneficiary criteria,
especially in a context where market relations are allowed to operate largely unchecked, is the
creation of an implicit hierarchy. Equity is then seen as a cost, rather than a contribution to the
overall programmes, and productivity considerations, implying a preference for emergent
entrepreneurs, are likely to gain priority. The policy is almost silent in outlining objectives of
enhancing healthy private-public partnership. It only states that "the government will seek to
enlist support of the private sector wherever this is possible and practical (DLA, 1997). A
cursory examination of this statement leads one conclude that the policy gratuitously belittles
the role that the private sector can play. The policy does not identify strategies, including
policy instruments which might be expected to realise this objective. The involvement of the
private sector in the land reform process is not either/or but is inevitable for this programme to
be sustained. Such a discussion would need to define what is meant by private-public
partnership and identify how each might or might not be efficient in relation to the resources
they require. It should also include an outline of the procedures by which institutional and
allocational decisions will involve them.
5.4 What or who is a Household?
The once-off grant ofR15 000 is the major policy instrument for the implementation of the
redistribution programme. This grant is intended for households, defined as a unit comprising
two adults who are married or habitually cohabit, or a single adult with proven financial
dependants (op cit: 71). When describing the practicalities of how the grant system will work
the policy switches to describing the beneficiary as an individual that would be allowed to
access the grant in order to meet land needs (op cit: 45). The assumption underlying the
treatment of a household as a person is that household heads will be claimants and
beneficiaries and that benefits will trickle down to other family members. The realities on the
ground are that households are not spheres of resource pooling and joint control. In families
where polygamy exists, household access to land would not necessarily benefit the other
women, yet the policy relies extensively on the household as a unit of allocation. Many authors
have picked this major weakness such as Hall (1996) who asserts that given power
relationship at household level, women will not directly benefit from the grants.
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5.5 Implementation in the Face of Shrinking Resources
The result of an ambitious policy with high resource implications, which the policy certainly is,
and insufficient state capacity to implement the programme to its full extent, is a gradually
diminishing optimism about land reform (Wixley, 1995). How will difficult choices be made in
the context of a squeeze on financial and institutional resources? The tendency to aggregate
the effects of land reform may cause the prioritisation of overall effects at the expense of the
distributional effects. This would justify an emphasis on ensuring the land is transferred, at the
cost of establishing to whom the land is transferred and whether this is consistent with the
equity principles of the policy.
In attempting to weigh up the value of prioritising certain aspects of policy given the limited
resources for implementation, one may be faced with sets of costs and benefits which cannot
be seen as equivalents. The critical point in this issue is the location of the decision making
structure. Experience shows that, to deal effectively with local requirements and to ensure
that land reform fits into local developmental goals, land reform has to be implemented in a
decentralized fashion.
6. KEY ISSUES FOR SOUTH AFRICA
6.1 The complexities and critical land issues facing South Africa resemble the
historically more difficult reform contexts when compared to Kenya and
Zimbabwe. Maintaining productivity and actually enhancing the living standards of
reform beneficiaries is not a foregone conclusion, but requires careful planning for
post-reform developmental needs. Policies expected to promote both equity and
productivity should identify how these can work together. It also needs to state how
conflicting criteria to promote these objectives should be reconciled in practice. The
White Paper in Land Policy does not do this. Instead, equity appears to be seen as a
cost to productivity. The tendency to see equity and productivity as necessarily hostile
to one another precludes opportunities to advance productivity through equity.
6.2 Providing beneficiaries with only land, and not a package including other
supporting services, undermines the potential of land reform to enhance the lives
of beneficiaries. The present land reform will inevitably not achieve maximum benefits
because its option for a market-based model treated reform as a series of transactions
between buyers and sellers. This has obscured the urgency ofgovernment meeting its
stated objectives. The scattered locations of land acquired through both the restitution
and market-based redistribution programs make this an especially challenging
unfinished risk.
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6.3 Tenure reform is not just a matter of changing rules, but of implementing those
rule~, and this requires reorganization and reorientation of existing institutions
in order to provide beneficiaries with secure tenure that does not undermine their
incentives to invest and produce. Secure tenure does not necessarily mean individual
private property, though it may mean that in certain contexts given beneficiary
aspirations and expectations. But it does necessarily mean property forms which local
people can manage themselves and with which they are comfortable. This requires
substantial commitments to public education, creating new systems of records of rights
in land and training for those participating in the system.
6.4 It is difficult to create new institutions ex nihilo, and it will generally be better to
build on existing institutional arrangements to the extent possible. Institutional
innovation is exciting and challenging, but in fact it is extraordinary complex and
cyclica~. This means that the resource implications of the policy should fit within the
constraints of the institutional, human and financial resources at the disposal of the
state. If the resources available are adequate to meet the requirements of policy,
priorities will be made in the course of implementation. While flexibility and adaptation
in the light of empirical experience are important, the urgency to transfer land may
result with stated objectives being sacrificed, marginalised lost or subverted.
CONCLUSION
Many of the points made from the comparative analysis are cautionary in nature. The
discussion indicated that although it does present new opportunities for people to gain access
to resources they were previously denied, the land reform programme may not be able to
deliver on its promise as stated in its vision. The land policy provided necessary but by no
means sufficient mechanisms for previously disadvantaged people to claim their land rights
and to exert greater control over productive resources in rural areas.
,
Analysis of the two White Papers on Land Reform shows that it was easy to define what was
wrong with the 1991 White Paper but slight less easy to define a realistic future vision and
more difficulties were encountered when specificities were outlined. It is plausible to conclude
that the 1997 White Paper is extraordinarily ambitious. It is ambitious because of the range of
injustices it proposes to right within a relatively short time, and because it proposes to do so
while respecting the property and process rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Lastly, it is
ambitious because so many fundamental changes required for effective implementation are still
being debated, such as reorganisation oflocal government structures. Overreaching is perhaps
the cardinal sin in land reform: daring too much, then achieving so little that confidence in the
reform is undermined.
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It has also been argued that a plan is ultimately judged in terms of its measurable effects on the
economy at large, an aggregate assessment in which the failure of particular projects may be
excused. In the case of the current land policy, this will hinge substantially on the amount of
land which changes hands: a quantitative rather than a qualitative measure. If the state chooses
to prioritise equity considerations in land reform, it needs to redefine what is meant by
success. This requires explicit priority to equity considerations to be consistent and sustained




POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
1. INTRODUCTION
The land reform challenge facing the new South African government is immense and, from the
perspective ofpolicy formulation, the government has responded in a credible fashion. From the
perspective of implementation, however, current progress does not appear to have met neither
the expectations ofpolicy makers nor those ofthe poor. There are many reasons for this, the most
important of which relate to the underlying distortions in economic markets and institutional
frameworks introduced by apartheid, which continue to produce and reproduce poverty and
inequality in South Mrica. This has created a necessity for understanding the state, market and
civil organisation as historically constructed institutions whose relation to one another changes
over time. Marcus (1994) asserted that in this century and especially over the past two decades,
policy emphasis has been redirected from market to state, back to the market and most recently
to civil organisations. This refocussing is in part an outcome of the development failures of each
set of institutions.
The President's genius at bringing the country together and inventing a vision of South Africa in
post-apartheid unity, undoubtedly created the first essential preconditions for viable nationhood.
The sustainability ofthis momentous achievement squarely relied on the ability of the government
to begin delivering essential services to all those deserving a decent chance in life. It is now
universally acceptable that the provision of services is seen by many communities as the
foundation for building a brighter future. One new technocrat was quoted while wondering and
looking out ofthe panoramic windows at Table Mountain saying that" how on earth would this
government get its arms around a bureaucracy calcified by 342 years of racial oppression".
Matisonn (1998) elaborating on the complexities ofgovernment procedures, compares working
in government to standing in front of a long piece of string. "You want something to be done.
You can't do it yourself, because it's too far away. So you push the string - and all that happens
is that your end compresses a few centimetres. Nothing else moves".
The weekly neyvspaper, Mail and Guardian (November 13 to 19, 1998), contained an,article on
administrative constraints that confronted the ANe government when it took over government.
In this article, Minister Naidoo is quoted as saying that" ... what we didn't think through clearly
enough was the institutional mechanisms to implement the service delivery programme (RDP).
My view changed on what could be done by the public sector as well as the private sector because
a lot ofdelivery is about innovation, risk and entrepreneurship". This statement clearly shows that
revolutionaries such as Minister Naidoo were sobered by high office responsibility and the
obligation to perform.
32
These observations are starting to manifest in the frustrations experienced at ground level as
projects get offto a slow start. The biggest and most serious problem was that many departments
lacked the equipment to perform the real, basic tasks of a government department: to develop
policies, plan strategically, and ensure that their sectors of the economy were regulated to achieve
their objectives fairly. Many departments were geared to serve a static white population under
siege, and run by a civil servant class that did not have a meaningful policy making capacity.
These departments were not equipped to develop strategies nor did they have the ability to
regulate their sectors. Services were provided by monopolistic parastatal companies which
regulated the industry themselves. The abolition of the RDP ministry showed a major shift in
government thinking and a move away from a romantic idea of what government could do. RDP
ministry's had no control over fiscal policy - that is, spending levels, and line function departments
considered the RDP office at minimum an intrusion, at most a threat. In government, delivery is
tied up in a lot of formal government procedures.
In short, there is no simple institutional (technical) answer for the effective implementation ofland
reform because the capacity and willingness of authorities to act are largely determined by the
balance of power within and beyond the institutions concerned. Since the politics of land
distribution are intimately related to control over the means of production, any institutional
arrangement will become the focus of social conflict and mobilisation. In order to begin to explain
and interpret policy formulation and practice, this chapter explores assumptions about the state,
and its relation to markets and civil organisations which underlie institutional designs for
implementation of land reform programmes and the delivery of services.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON LAND REFORM
An overarching theme of the transition to democracy was the notion of nation building and the
development ofa common patriotism among all South Africans. A Constitution characterised by
broad consensus was seen by many as the cornerstone for successful implementation of nation
building. It emerged from the constitutional discussions that the resources of the various
provinces were unequal and provinces could 'lock in' their own resources to the detriment of
others, and that the provinces lacked financial, technological and administrative capacities
required in the land reform process (de Villiers, 1996). Hence, land matters were placed within
the national competence to effect strong centrally driven land reform, so that nationhood and
economic development can be promoted (Louw, 1997).
What does the surge in democracy and capitalism portend for economic growth? The shift toward
popular government was predicted by some to accelerate growth, by others to retard it. Often left
out of the equation is property rights as a factor distinct from democratic rule. The process of
drafting the new Constitution reflected the chasm separating those who favour and those who
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oppose a strong system ofproperty rights. The interpretation of"The property clause: section 28"
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 was discussed extensively by
various authors. The Constitution of 1996 which superseded the interim Constitution of 1993
continued to receive criticisms that were based on the negative implications of this clause, that
is, the case for protection of properties is somehow in conflict with the case for restitution and
will provide severe limitations of accessing land for landless. Section 25 of the new Constitution
continued with this property clause although it was a bone of contention until it was settled by the
Constitutional Court.
2.1 Section 25: Stumbling Block to land reform
Property rights were at the centre stage of South Mrica's recent effort to write a new
Constitution. While provisions protecting such rights were included in the Constitution, they are
less than perfect. The reason being that both opponents and supporters of strong property rights
safeguards, continue to look at this critical issue from their own historical vantage point. Whites
who supported strong property rights seemed to be primarily concerned with not losing what they
gained under apartheid. Blacks, opposing such rights, saw in them only the protection of
illegitimate white privilege.
Under the Constitution ofthe Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) the government
in fact has a duty to make land rights stronger. Section 25(6) of the Constitution states: a person
or community whose tenure ofland is legally insecure as a result ofpast discriminatory laws or
practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act ofParliament, either to tenure which is
legally secure or to comparable redress. This means that the government is constitutionally
bound to take ~.ctive steps to correct the results of past discrimination. However, the yery' same
Constitution contains section 25 which is still a bone of contention. Section 25 deals with the
property clause which was the major compromise reached between the then ruling party and the
ANC. The ANC was concerned that section 25 would hamper the land reform process while the
National Party was trying to protect individual land ownership (especially those of farmers).
The property clause remained a matter of contention until the matter was settled by the
Constitutional Court. Two major objections against section 25 were raised, namely that (a) this
section did not expressly protect the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property and (b) the
provisions regarding expropriation were inadequate. The Constitutional Court found that the right
to property although mentioned in the Bills ofRights of some countries and in article 17 of the
Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, no universally recognised formulation of property exists.
The protection was implicit in clause 25 (Du Plessis and Olivier, 1997). The Court also found
that from a cpmparative international perspective, various formulations and a wide range of
criteria regarding expropriation and compensation exist. It rejected, an objection against
calculation of compensation on the basis of market value.
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In the final version ofsection 25, the reference to the protection of rights in property was left out
and provision was made for expropriation and deprivation in the case ofland reform. This ruling,
effectively constrained the vigorous land reform as it was envisaged in the RDP policy document
and forced the state to follow strict legal procedures in the implementation of land reform.
Institutions for implementing land reform were then organised and designed in accordance with
the legal parameters that would enable the state to follow strict legal instruments.
Although the new order is primarily concerned with facilitating a reallocation of land rights
without major departure from the pre-existing model, it is worth observing that the land reform
programme is being implemented within the framework of the constitution which, of course, is
now the ruling feature to the extent that the common law no longer has its former pre-eminence.
To this extent, many policy makers have found it difficult to see the scope for an assertion of
common law rights against a position supported by the reform agenda. What is largely involved
in the reform process has not, and apparently will not, affect the fundamental character and
substance of the law of property. The radical aspect appears to lie primarily in features external
to the law of property which are present to facilitate the implementation of the reform process -
the form of adjudication applied to restitution being an instance of this.
Section 25 (5-7) constitutionalises the three land reform programmes as set out in the
government's 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy. Section 25(5) empowers the State
to take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources, to foster
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. Section 25(6) puts
the validity of the tenure reform programme beyond doubt, and provides for national legislation
to ensure tenure security. The most prominent subsection is section 25(7) which states that" Cl
person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past
discriminatory laws orpractices is entitled, to the extentprovided by an Act ofParliament, either
to restitution of that property or to equitable redress". In addition, section 25(8) enables the
State, notwithstanding the content of the other subsections of section 25, to take legislative and
other measures to achieve land, water and related reform (provided that such departure should
be in accordance with section 36 (1) - general limitations clause). These provisions in sections 25
(5-9) compel the national legislation to form a detailed framework for the implementation of the
land reform programme.
2.2 Dimensions of Interj urisdictional Cooperation
The Constitution guarantees the right ofthe provinces to legislate on a range of matters although
the National Parliament can override such legislation whenever certain vague and general criteria
are not met. It is the supreme law of the land which means that any act that violates the
Constitution is null and void. This applies to all spheres ofgovernment. Land matters fall in the
category ofresidual or undefined powers that remain with the National Parliament. The functional
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areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence (Schedule 4) and functional
areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence (Schedule 5) do not include land reform
programmes [The Constitution (Act 108 of 1996)]. The powers of the provinces are not wholly
concurrent because national laws can nullify provincial laws when the latter do not comply with
the criteria for a national override - thus indicating some limited scope for exclusive powers for
provinces. Land matters have been made by the Constitution to be one of those areas where the
national Parliament can use its powers to legislate by means of its 'implied' powers, hence, land
matters fall in the category that is neither fully concurrent nor exclusive. A number of
constitutional authors have asserted that constitutions and practical realities have enabled national
parliaments to influence, direct and even dictate provincial policy to a far greater extent than could
be deduced from the text of the Constitution.
In strict legal terms, the National Department ofLand Affairs is the only department assigned to
implement the land reform programme. However, section 41(1) of the Constitution deals with
the principles ofco-operative government and intergovernmental relations. Section 41 (1 )(g) states
that spheres of government must exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner
that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in
another sphere. This provision makes it quite crucial for the Department ofLand Affairs to devise
a form of symbiotic relationship which will as far as possible, require the department to provide
the foundation for a centrist approach with substantially decentralised implementing agents. This
means that an institutional framework for implementing land reform should be based on a
pragmatic relationship that would ensure that national policy is addressed on an integrated basis,
that provincial policy adheres to overarching national interests and cooperation between spheres
ofgovernment is ensured in as many fields of activity as possible.
This type of cooperation will not be divorced from Interjurisdictional conflicts that were
experienced in the debates of unitary versus federal states. The provincial autonomy debate
stressed competitiveness where the national and provincial governments were in opposite c.amps
and cooperation was the exception rather than a rule. Those debates were characterised by
absolutes that largely ignore the myriad of federal, unitary and hybrid systems that have been
developed internationally. As higWighted by de Villiers (1996), a comparison of centralized
federations and decentralized unions reveals a grey area where a rigid application of theoretical
models does not work. The best known relationships were not so much as a result of clear
philosophical plan, but rather the outcome of pragmatic considerations and historical forces at
that particular time.
The approach of interpreting relationships between spheres ofgovernment tends to focus much
on the allocation ofpowers as outlined in the Constitution, ignoring constitutional obligations in
terms of financial relationships, grants-in-aid by the central government, intergovernmental
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relations and accords. A famous clause in the Constitution that is always referred to is Section
41 (1)(f): which states that spheres ofgovemment must not assume any power or function except
those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution. This provision has been approached by
many as it has only a single meaning, incapable of any alteration or improvement, and as if it
excludes the opportunity for experimentation, creativity and compromise. As a result, this narrow
interpretation has made it more difficult to develop a land reform programme based on the middle
ground. Instead, there is too much emphasis being placed on powers and too little on pragmatism
and problem solving.
In the context ofprospective constitutional obligations, where the Constitution sets up a political
structure within which national institutions engaged in a wide range of shared functions with other
spheres of government, there is no 'one best way' to achieve effective symbiotic relationships
between spheres ofgovernment. It is critical for the Department ofLand Affairs to be aware of
constitutional constraints and not be driven by a belief in cooperation as the panacea for the land
reform problems, or by some set of preconceived notions about what is and is not good for
cooperation. Different cooperative strategies should be judged only against the expectations of
the jurisdictions in the province where cooperation is being cultivated. What is possible in one
area may be possible only in that area. There is no benchmark to denote satisfactory levels of
interjurisdictional cooperation.
2.3 Constitutional Obligations and Practices: Formal and Informal Institutions
There are two dimensions that need to be considered in an attempt to deal with institutional
factors that are determinants of an effective land reform implementation process. The first is that
ofthe content and strength of the rights defined in law, and thus of the terrain of struggle within
which these rights-based laws are drafted and then enacted. The second is that of how these
formally defined rights intersect and interact with other institutional frameworks, both formal and
informal, in the real world context of the prospective rights-holders. The latter dimension is
crucial for this exercise to emphasise that no common tactical approach or institutional format
meets the needs ofeach different provincial culture. Different tactics and approaches may achieve
similar outcomes. It is thus highly pertinent to focus on the latter from an institutional perspective.
Many analysts of institutional development ( e.g Gore, 1993; Moore, 1995 and Cousins, 1997)
believe that different institutional development strategies should be judged only against the
expectations ofthose institutions. They contend that institutional development is the outcome of
those organisations pursuing their own interests and establishing relationships to satisfy their own
pecuniary or philanthropic objectives. This is the classical form of institutional arrangement in
which spheres \~fgovernment pursue their own self-interest without the aid of central: authority
to force them to cooperate (Axelrod, 1984). Perhaps one cannot go off at ,a tangent to suggest
that it is easier to conceptualize than to define and measure cooperation in an institutional setting.
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Cousins (1997) attempted to distinguish between formal and informal institutions. In his
discussion, he sees rules as prescribing room for manoeuvre rather than determining behaviour.
Formal institutions, put simply, are those backed by law, implying enforcement of rules by the
State, while informal institutions are upheld by mutual agreement, or by relations of power or
authority and rules are then enforced endogenously. Swift (1994) provided another
complementary distinction by stating that formal/de jure institutions are conceptualized as those
established in written law created by conscious recorded decision with established precedents.
Informal institutions are said to be unwritten rules and procedures and unofficial strategies which
local people create and pursue in order to govern the use of their common objective (Cousins and
Robins, 1993). A feature ofinformal institutions is that they are not codified in law. The kind of
relationships and institutional arrangements that have evolved between the Department ofLand
Affairs and other spheres ofgovernments have largely been influenced by the latter.
The old orthodox approach relating to the implementation of policies such as land reform
constituted a top down, blue print approach. This was characterised by a hegemonic formal/de
jure institutional order, which the state authoritatively set in place to govern the use and
management ofresources (Archer, 1995). One negative aspect was that this hegemonic formal/de
jure institutional order, typically marginalized and undermined local people's informal/de facto
institutions and forms oforganization. Marinus (1998) in a case study ofNamaqualand concluded
that the formal institutional order envisaged communities to be isolated, homogeneous and non-
literate. It was maintained that their decisions and social relations (far from being rational or
scientific) were traditional, backward, whimsical and irrational. Despite the politics of the
hegemonic formalized institutional order, local people established and pursued informal/de facto
institutions. These took the form of' endogenously generated' institutions to govern the use and
management ofnatural resources as opposed to formal 'exogenously generated' institutions. This
case study highlights the informal institutional role in counter balancing the inefficiency in the
formal system ofgovernance.
The illustration ofthe above case study is not meant to suggest that the emphasis should now shift
to the adoption of a "replacement paradigm" which exclusively aims to replace, normalize and
formalize the informal institutional order. What is advocated is an "adaptation paradigm" that
would recognise the need to replace certain informal and even formal institutions and the
recognition ofthe significance of the informal/de facto institutional order, and the need to build
upon the latter. The unwritten nature of informal institutions makes it amenable to simplicity and
flexibility, particularly within a variable and uncertain environment. Having stated this, a
fundamental realization is that certain informal institutions could be formalized. However, the very
act offormalising all informal institutions may result in static and inappropriate laws. According
to Claassens (1994), informal institutions by their very nature may be difficult to codify in law
without losing its internal complexity, flexibility and adaptability to change. In short, the
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formalisation of all informal institutions may in effect devalue them.
Moore (1975) in her attempt to establish a relationship between formal and informal institutions
suggested that they coexist and interact in a complex and dynamic manner. She asserted that
reglementory processes (all those attempts to organise and control behaviour through the use of
explicit rules) take place at a multiplicity oflevels within society, and within a variety of social
fields. Numerous conflicting or competing rule orders exist," characterised more often than not
by ambiguities, inconsistencies, gaps and conflicts" (Moore, 1975: 3). Cousins and Robins (1993)
assert that institutional analysts must include both structural analysis of complexes of rule-orders,
that is, questions of domination/autonomy, hierarchy/equivalence, proliferation/reduction,
amalgamation/division and replication/diversification in the relations within and among the
constitutive levels and units, and analysis of institutional processes.
In the context <?fland reform programmes, it becomes clearer that institutions for implementation
need to be located within this complex institutional framework (including all spheres of
government) which links the position of role players at the micro-level to the macro-level
conditions which prevail in the wider constitutional context. The complexities that arise when
competence over land matters is located in the national sphere and service delivery competence
is located in provincial/local spheres of government is well illustrated in planning and
implementation ofland reform programmes. Especially the redistribution and tenure reform. What
is envisaged is an approach that would put the onus on local stakeholders to devise and implement
practical solutions to issues such as tenure disputes, and which provides incentives to combine
on-land solutions with off-land solutions for others.
As Marinus (1998, 1) writes" land reform programmes are constituted by and through struggle.
Thus they have the capacity to be elements of emancipation, but they are neither a perfect nor
exclusive vehicle for emancipation. They can only be operative as constituents of a strategy of. . .
social transformation as they become part of an emergent 'common sense' and are articulated
within social practices". This institutional complexity involved in the land reform programme
suggests that, however necessary constitutional provisions are in the South African context, they
are far from sufficient. They are in fact, the starting point for an effective politics of
implementation.
An important policy implication is that the state should offer an enabling legislative framework
rather than to attempt to provide legal frameworks down to the lowest level. An enabling
framework would ensure that negotiation of access, transfer and inheritance of land and resource
management be done at the local level. This would entail the state promoting procedural rather
than substantive and precise legislation (Marinus, 1998). Such a framework would facilitate
flexibility and diversity in the institutional design, which would accommodate opportunistic use
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of resources and reflect the dynamic nature of the provincial planning and development
legislations. Importantly, such a framework would entail the provision of formal rule enforcement
procedures to back those which may prove ineffective at lower levels, but without imposing rigid,
restrictive and prescriptive structures.
3. THE DUALITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
South African democracy arrived at the time when communism and African socialism were
collapsing and renewed interest in alternatives to the state as a vehicle for and promoter of
development was gaining momentum (Stein, 1997). Thus, 'civil society', 'popular participation'
and 'people's empowerment' have replaced socialism and anti-imperialism as slogans of the day.
The attitude towards the state changed and it is now seen as the problem rather than the solution.
In this context, South Africa started to implement institutional reforms at the political level
(democratisation and privatisation) and at the administrative level (rationalisation and
reorganisation). One of the catchwords in the current wave of reform is decentralisation. This
changing outlook led hard core advocates of privatisation such as World Bank to join the
proponents of community development and people's participation in making the case for the
transfer of government powers from the centre to local authorities (Williams, 1995)
3.1 Asymmetrical relation between Central and Local Government
South Africa has been given a rare and historic opportunity to transform local government to meet
the needs ofthe country for the next century. Although local government will, until 1999, remain
subject to the precepts ofthe tr.ansition process as regulated by the Local Government Transition
Act of 1993 (Act 209 of 1993), the Constitution envisaged a complete transformation of the local
government system. In terms ofthe Constitution, local government is a sphere ofgovernment in
its own right and no longer a function ofnational or provincial government (section 40(1)). Local
government has also been given a distinctive role in building de~ocracy and promoting socio-
economic development (section 153 (a)(b)). This major constitutional development in terms of
giving autonomy to local governments is one of the hallmarks of the new political dispensation.
However, this milestone will become meaningful only when it is connected to a substantial
objective.
Local government institutions have been placed in an ambiguous position within the Constitution.
They are institutions for local self-government, with their own political basis and their own
priorities. In this capacity, they are supposed to represent and serve the interests of their local
communities? to which they are also held accountable (section 152 (1)(2)). But they aryals~ one
element in the comprehensive public sector and, as such, are under the authority of and held
accountable to central and provincial governments (section 151 (3)). This implies that central
government created local government structures, both in the sense that the state is always free to
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divide its territory into administrative units as it wishes (for instance, there is only one national
Demarcation Board responsible for demarcating local council boundaries) and defines the
responsibilities to be given to local governments. The Constitution makes provision for the central
government to establish the nature and extent oflocal autonomy, and one may conclude that local
government autonomy is therefore a 'gift' from the cental government which can be with~rawn
at any time. This does not imply that local government has no autonomy; however, it means that
the boundaries of its autonomy are drawn not by itself, but by the central government. This
asymmetrical relation between central and local government implies that local government
structures obliged to implement the policies of the central government when they are expected
to do so, even if they disagree with them.
The ambitious expectations that have been created by the land reform process through the White
Paper on South African Land Policy poses a question of the capabilities of current local
governments in terms of matching the ambitions. The fact that local government structures are
expected to represent the interests of the local community does create expectations in the
community. This puts local authorities at the intersection between the state and the community.
Department of Land Affairs officials are not working for local government but are directly
communicating with the communities, with and in most cases without the knowledge of those
local governinent structures. In this context, local government structures are normally faced with
conflicting demands. For instance, if the policies of the central government are unpopular or at
odds with the priorities of the local community, local authorities find it difficult to engage
themselves and yet communities are expecting the local leaders to assist and guide them in all
development programmes. This, ofcourse puts more pressure on the local government both from
the central government and from their local communities. In these situations, local authorities
have been caught between a rock and a hard surface, squeezed from both sides, and unable to
satisfy both parties at the same time.
There has been a tendency from the Department ofLand Affairs to adopt policies which require
large-scale state intervention with massive infrastructural needs. A consequence of these policies
has been great expansion of the Department itself, its responsibilities and the number of staff
Many of the new responsibilities that the department has taken upon itself are of a kind that
require subst~tial state presence at the local level. This scenario creates a situation that is prone
to encountering resistance, mistrust and opposition from local government structures.
Consequently, the resources that are required to succeed are enormous and beyond the state's
capacity. According to one official from the department, this situation has led to the department
to start establishing alliances between local government structures and provincial departments.
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3.2 Land Reform: Unfinished Policy of Decentralisation to Local Government
The White Paper on Local Government, 1996 assigns tasks to local government that range from
the delivery ofbasic needs to the protection and promotion of communities' human rights. It has
also been assigned with the responsibility of being a point of coordination and implementation
of national policies and programmes. These are, however, subject to national or provincial
legislation.
,
This indicates that local government should be seen as representing the central government at the
local level, and not representing the interests of the local community and its local governance
structures. This also means that land reform should be seen mainly as a technical task to be
handled by exp~rts coming from outside the local structures. The subjects (technical experts at
the central and provincial level) and the objects (the local community) ofland reform are clearly
separated, perhaps indicating the externality of the state in relation to its population. Since the
influence of the local governance structures are very limited, the self-determination of the
community seems to exist mainly as rhetoric.
The White Paper, while well-written, has critical omissions and lack clarity on important issues.
It failed to resolve the tension between the desire for strong local government as an engine for
growth and development and the reality of a sector in fundamental crisis. It did not provide an
adequate policy framework for local authorities to promote the development needed to sustain
the provision ofat least basic services to all their inhabitants (Bernstein, 1998). The first attribute
of land reform should be the awareness of the importance of the development support system.
The whole structure of institutions, rules, working methods and attitudes are supposed to be
geared to t~e daunting task of unpacking real limits in terms of local government capacity and
fully engage the substantial unused capacity for local infrastructural development that exists in the
private sector.
The effective implementation of land reform programmes requires a proper inventory of the
precise nature and dimensions of the challenges and problems that beset local government
structures. What is expected from the implementors of land reform is not an ever-lengthening list
ofthings that local governments must do, but a more strategic approach to the question of their
roles and functions as envisaged in both the White Paper on Land Reform and on the Local
Government White Paper. One can then derive specific strategies and models that are realistic,
practically implementable and ultimately sustainable. The challenges facing the role players in the
implementation will differ from one project to the other, however common the root causes may
be. The tendency of the department to impose a uniform set of solutions is not a desirable
approach. Key choices concerning the priorities for action must be made within the local context,
in combination\yith a set ofnationally based performance management crit~ria and indicators, as
suggested in the White Paper on Local Government.
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4. DISCREPANCY BETWEEN PLANNING AND BUDGETING
The Minister of Finance termed the year 1998 a "People's Budget" - a budget that will take a
significant step towards alleviating poverty in South Africa. The government has been hard
pressed to achieve its plans for social delivery due to the fiscal constraints of the Growth,
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. This year's budget was intended to show how
the government plans to effect 'socio-economic change and deliver on growth and equity (Krafchik
and Robinson, 1998). Despite the incremental shift of resources toward the poor, the government
is not maximising the effectiveness of the resources available for poverty alleviation especially in
the rural areas. This is evident in the government policy document (White Paper on South Mrican
Land Policy) correctly identifying the rural areas as the focus of poverty in South Mrica but
failing to achieve effective rural targeting in budgetary programmes. The current budget
allocations are still reflecting the urban influence and serious uncoordination.
In an effort to address this anomaly, a plethora of policies and programmes reflecting a broad
commitment to the reduction of poverty and inequality has constantly formed the basis of the
vision presented by the new government. However, these policies have yet to be presented as a
systematic response in which priorities and sequencing is indicated. In addition, the implications
of current macro-economic policy for the implementation of sectoral policies remains a subject
for debate, while the micro-economic impact of different policies is unclear.
:' I
Empirical experience has also shown that an unqualified belief in the ability of the market to
provide for the poor is incorrect (May, 1998). In many instances, the poor have not benefited
from market-oriented macroeconomic policy reforms because the underlying institutional context
has remained the same. Of particular concern are the many land reform programmes that have
encountered problems in their implementation. In some instances, this can be traced to insufficient
resource allocations, in others, the problems relate to poor planning and budgeting. A general
concern is the capacity of the inherited institutional structure to implement a developmental
agenda and the risk of corruption that it is normally associated with.
The interface and linkage between planning and budgeting raises two areas of policy formulation
that need to be considered. Firstly, there is a clear tension between the demand for fiscal
conservatism and the extent of expenditure requirements in state intervention. The result of this
tension may well be the retardation of the kind ofhuman resource development which is required
to support future growth and development. Secondly, a zero-based budgeting process raises the
expectation that each budget has been constructed from scratch to reflect current/future goals and
objectives. In reality, the large bulk of the budget is predetermined by investments on long-term
capital development projects that were initiated in previous years.
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4.1 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy
During the fust'18 months ofthe new government, significant foreign exchange did come in'. The
macro-economic policy was on track. South Africa was out of recession for the first time in the
1990s but was it a fundamental turnaround of the economy, when the delivery of many,
programmes was extremely slow (Mail and Guardian, 19110/ 1998)? Later in 1995 it started to
be become apparent that the honeymoon was over. The economy was levelling off. The
government realised there were major problems with delivery, and recognised the need for a new
growth strategy. At a workshop in late 1995, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki presented a
document called the National Growth Strategy. Several financial experts felt that the document
was lacking a macro-economic thrust. By early 1996, key figures in the Finance Department were
increasingly convinced that the rand was too high and needed to be devalued so that it could boost
the exports. Discussions began about how to achieve a devaluation, given the independence of
the central bank, and how to prepare the markets and take maximum advantage of a devaluation.
Investors learned about the concern of the government and they accordingly saw the direction in
which the policy was moving. Hence they sold rands and the devaluation strategy became
superfluous.
Work then began on the growth, employment and redistribution document that became known
as GEAR. This document spelt out the macro-economic strategy of the government but it caused
great acrimony, especially for those political movements that pride themselves on consultation.
This document was issued without even debate in the ruling party's national executive committee.
One official from the finance department defended the approach by saying that " economic
orthodoxy tends to encourage non-consultation". The independence of the central bank is
advocated precisely to insulate it from political influence. The whole acrimony towards the GEAR
strategy is encapsulated by Jeremy Cronin ofCOSATU who said: "GEAR was a strategy to solicit
passing global traffic. GEAR puts us on the kerbside and made us vulnerable to global traffic and
it gave us no protective measures" (Financial Mail, 12110/1998). Whatever differences might
have occurn;d in the issuing ofthe document, GEAR proposes a general thrust toward~ redJ.lcing
the deficit, reducing the role ofthe government relative to the private sector and expecting growth
to come from private sector satisfaction with government policy leading to investment.
Specific strategies for achieving reduction of government debt, creating an export-oriented
economy and increasing employment are having direct negative implications for, the
implementation ofland reform in South Mrica. Critical areas are the following:
4.1.1 Reducing the Role of Government in the Economy
Over the past decade, governments have been increasingly constrained in the actions that they are
able to take to promote growth or regulate the ways in which the benefits of growth are
distributed. The tacit assumption behind this approach has been that the benefits ofgrowth would
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reach the poor through a trickle down effect. All that was needed for successful development,
then, was the freeing up of markets and removal of state controls and intervention (May, 1998).
The unqualified beliefin the ability ofthe market to provide for the poor requires further scrutiny
before it is accepted as the norm. In many instances, the poor have not benefited from the market-
oriented macro-economic policy reforms because the underlying institutional context has remained
intact. It is unthinkable that the market (in this case the farmers) can contribute towards fulfilment
ofthe goals ofthe land reform programme. The reason being that it is their farms that are targeted
and farmer's influence in shaping the 1991 White Paper leaves no option for the state but to
intervene vigorously. Experiences in countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe tend to confirm the
views that market failure calls for some form of state intervention. It is argued that the state has
a central role to play in the development of non-tradable goods such as infrastructure and
provision of social safety nets.
Budgeting is more than merely the automatic translation ofgovernment decisions or legislation
into resource allocation. Public expenditure decision-making is intrinsically higWy politicized.
Budget decisions will determine the time profile of a new government coming on stream or the
level at which land reform programme is at least delivered over a period of years. It is against this
observation that the strategic involvement of the government in the economy requires more than
just relying on the private sector. Conditions of poverty are not susceptible to operations of the
market as seen in areas where land reform is a necessity.
Forcing international competition on new businesses can just as easily destroy communities. The
economy will not grow unless the government invests in programmes such as land reform. These
are programmes the government cannot expect the private sector to invest in because. there are
not sufficient profits in doing so and yet without this investment, the government will continue
to have a country where the majority ofpeople are poverty stricken, under-skilled and unhealthy.
In other words, the faith that full liberalisation will automatically improve an economy has been
shown to be baseless in many countries. In many poor countries, liberalisation has resulted in an
escalation of poverty and landlessness, private sector disinvestment in the economy and
increasingly indebted governments (Financial Mail, 12110/1998).
4.1.2 GEAR Deficit and Growth Performance
The underlying assumption of GEAR is that if government eliminates its debt and creates an
export economy, the result will be an increase in internal and foreign investment thereby resulting
in increase in economic growth and creation ofjobs. This outcome depends on GEAR succeeding
in stimulating the economy. This assumption makes it imperative to mention that annual economic
growth does t:lot always translate into economic development for the poor in those countries.
Sudan, a country whose back is being broken by starvation, has an annual growth rate of six
percent (Krafchik and Robinson, 1998). Other countries such as Uganda and Brazil also have
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impressive economic growth figures. However, for the majority, poverty, unemployment and
inadequate access to facilities such as land remain the norm. GEAR, with its outward looking
policy which emphasises an export-led approach will therefore have a propensity to fiustrate any
attempts at meeting the basic needs of reducing inequality and poverty.
A wide range oforganisations, including the Financial and Fiscal Commission, have recently fome
out in favou~ of relaxation oithe government's deficit reduction targets. Such relaxation could
inject urgently needed resources into development, allowing an increase in the pace of delivery.
At the very least, GEAR's deficit targets should be brought in line with its growth performance
(May, 1998). The debt is large and great efforts have been made to tame inflation. Nevertheless,
the Constitution demands that the government makes the maximum possible resources available
for poverty alleviation and ensure that the approach to growth is congruent with the approach to
poverty. GEAR's performance, juxtaposed against growing poverty, demands a full investigation
into the possibility ofeasing up on the pace ofdeficit reduction without aggravating inflation. This
can be achieved by increasing effectiveness in the form of integrated approach in the expenditure
of implementing land reform. To avoid generating another 'wish list' of interventions, it becomes
important to analyse the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and highlight the major
impediments to its achieving the integrated budgeting system it proposes.
4.2 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)
The introduction of the MTEF in 1996 was welcomed by many policy makers as it was seen as
a major shift by the Ministry ofFinance towards a multi-year budget. It represented a significant
departure from the annual, incremental; and ad hoc budgeting of the past. It intended to establish
transparent rolling budgets and support effective planning to meet the policy priorities of national.,
provincial and local governments. Although this concept is largely welcomed, it is surprising to
note that little analysis ofthe MTEF has taken place. Concerted efforts have been directed to the
analysis of GEAR and this is an unfortunate oversight, since the MTEF requires fundamental
overhaul ofthe operation ofgovernment and reflects government priorities (Pintusewitz, 1997).
The MTEF should be understood as a tool for facilitating presentation of the spending priorities
and plans of government over a number of years, and for matching these plans with the fiscal
resources available. A member of the Financial and Fiscal Commission described it as a " wider
overhaul of the budgetary process, intended to provide the bridge between the technical
preparation of the budgets and the need to reflect political priorities in expenditure plans". The
MTEF has created an opportunity where programmes can continuously be reviewed in terms of
the resources devoted to them and the priority accorded to them without necessarily being any
explicit change in government statements and legislations. It has a potential to be a vehicle for
transforming the functioning of government, in particular to bring budgeting and planning
together in a generalised manner. It has a potential ofintroducing dialogue within the government
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budgetary system and incorporating bottom-up plans coupled with sectoral policies. The Minster
ofFinance has recently been quoted saying that" MTEF requires some changes to the institutions
ofgovernment to ensure that the right incentives become entrenched as good governance in South
Africa. For this to occur, an immediate priority is to stabilise the present system and focus on the
achievement of outcomes" (Mail and Guardian, 19/10/1998).
4.2.1 Communicative Budgetary Process
The essence of the MTEF is to facilitate a dialogue within departments, with other government
departments, as well as other spheres ofgovernments which must result in matching expenditure
responsibilities (and priorities) with revenue. Since this is a dynamic process, it also involves the
need to support a public sector budgeting and management system with the correct incentives for
efficient, effective and equitable public finance (Department ofFinance, 1996). This results in a
competitive budget process whereby departments compete for resources. Projects and
programmes are prioritised according to the benefits expected from the expenditure, national
political inte~ests and local co~cerns. The intention of increasing communication withi~ the state
organs is a concept that has been viewed positively but has been hampered by the institutional
context that was not geared towards this common goal. The aim of creating consensus over
revenue and expenditure priorities can never be attained in an institutional environment where
each department continues to make its own budget, prioritise and finish allocations without any
reference to other departments.
This situation is exacerbated by the absence of a budget matrix where all pnontles and
expenditures of the government (National, Provincial and Local) can be weighed against one
anoth~r. What is happening is that the Department of Land Affairs prepares its own budget,
prioritises its expenditure, project it for a three year period and then submits it to the Treasury for
final approval. In the process ofpreparing their budget, there is no reference nor communication
with other spheres ofgovernments to match the expenditures so that there could be continuation
in the impleme,ntation process. What is more evident is that all departments show only limited
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capacity for rational consideration of their chosen objectives. They do not seem to examine them
in sufficient detail, nor do they fully explore the consequences of their chosen actions.
It is mentioned in the Department of Finance document that MTEF will be consistent with a
decentralised system of government. The existing communication gap within the government
system makes the concept of accommodating both the reallocation of resources between
programmes and reprioritisation within the programmes themselves just rhetoric. The government
should start to realise that what the MTEF does is to provide some idea of the changing priorities
ofgovernment. In the short term, changes in priority will be reflected in marginal changes in the
total allocated to a particular activity, since it is difficult within the existing institutional
framework to make substantial changes in the short term and impossible to consider a programme
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from scratch. What this means is that there is a need to study budget; looking at how expenditures
are attached to policies and how the complementaries and conflicts arising from policies
competing for the same resources are resolved.
4.2.2 Institutional Change
Multi-year budgeting is new and very different from the manner in which South Africa has
budgeted in the past. Putting the system in place will require substantial institutional change. For
instance, no incidence or utilisation data is currently collected in the budgeting process. There are
not a sufficient number of experienced financial managers with an ability to prepare sound
financial planning at all spheres ofgovernment. A good balance has to be found between building
an 'ideal' system and supporting the transformation of the present system. The MTEF was
introduced without a system to support the shift to objective oriented budgeting and to allow for
an accrual system. More support is required in provinces that have inherited the large former Self-
Governing Territories and Homelands. Due to the interplay of many changing circumstances, the
outcomes ofwhich are difficult to quantifY in their individual capacities, the ability to relate cause. .
and effect has broken down.
The time-table within which the incentives and the rules for policy development are developed
must be carefully monitored. At present, policies for most departments are being drastically
revised. However, the cost implications ofpolicies and their administrative requirements have not
been adequately assessed. Thus priorities that are going to have a positive impact on the
implementation of land reform are going to be difficult to accommodate in the budgets of
governmental departments. This requires the Department of Land Affairs to pilot those areas
that are backed by proper plaJU?ing and also reflecting competitive adminis~rative and managerial
skills. Clarity over re-distributive goals is essential in order to resolve the political uncertainty of
government programmes. In the absence ofsuch an approach, land reform programmes are going
to continue involving conflict over spending decisions which impact on provincial and local
governments.
4.2.3 Accountability
South Africa has a Constitution that creates a comprehensive system of checks and balances. The
Constitution, however, confers a considerable degree of powers over expenditure to local
government bodies, particularly in relation to the provision of service delivery. Budgeting is
therefore expected to occur in an environment where there is clarity on which sphere is
accountable for what ascpect ofthe land reform process. This is crucial in a system with a number
of spheres of government. In the absence of clear accountability, it is impossible to ensure that
governments.' spriorities can be established and consensus over revenue and spending programmes
achieved. It is suggested that there should be means of attaining consensus in institutions such
as the Budget Council and the Inter-Governmental Forum, rather than through legislated co-
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ordination. This is an informal institutional arrangement where informal linkages are established
without necessarily conflicting with rules and regulations. This mechanism will be able to translate
national priorities into implementable provincial and local government programmes without
undermining the ability of these governments to determine their own priorities.
In the abserice of two-way lines of communication, the MTEF becomes largely a monologue.
What is also noticeable is that the section ofthe MTEF document on priorities is very generalised
and reflects a lack of clarity over the resources required and the priorities of spending. If the
MTEF is going to be a tool for bringing the macro-economic programme and the government's
spending plans together, then dialogue (concerning policy, funding and planning) and the process
ofplanning and prioritising spending have to be enhanced. The government has to reconcile these
divergent policies. Without consensus over spending, clear accountability, and the tools needed
for managing spending, the MTEF will be inherently limited as a means of meeting widely
accepted land reform principles.
5. PRACTICAL LAND REFORM CHALLENGES IN KWAZULU-NATAL
Connecting the dots between institutional determinants and the constitutional obligations is a
prerequisite' to understanding the dynamic, complex nature of rural development. issues in
KwaZulu-Natal. Establishing and maintaining strong local service delivery structures of
representation and accountability in rural KwaZulu-Natal depends on the legitimacy or otherwise
of the chieftaincy and whether or how traditional leaders are accommodated within the local
structures (McIntosh, 1995). Barnes and Morris (1997) assert that local service in rural KwaZulu-
Natal will not operate efficiently or sustainably unless an appropriate development-oriented rural
institutional environment is established. Institutional environment is, however, influenced and
determined by parameters such as tenurial rights, applicable legislations and viability of local
government structure. Another important constitutional element is the need to recognise that
KwaZulu-Natal's present rural local government institutions differs from the other provinces.
Regional Councils are currently legally recognised as de facto local authorities for all those areas
outside formal Transitional Local Councils.
5.1 THE IMPACT OF PAST POLICIES
Rural areas throughout South Africa have been shaped and conditioned by past policies. These
policies have influenced or determined settlement patterns and demographic profiles, access or
lack of access to services and facilities, and the location and character of economic activity
(McIntosh, 1997). Historically, the concentration ofpeople in settlements, villages or towns came
about for convenience oftrade, security, social interaction and culture. In some instances, as with
most of Sub-Saharan Mrica, the need for extensive pastoral activities kept people in scattered
locations. This was the case in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) where over a hundred years ago most of
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the Black population were pastoralists (Hornby, 1996). However, as the policies of the colonial
settlers began to take effect, people became more confined with the apartheid policies. People
were further forced off traditional land holdings causing premature change in the pattern of land
rights. This became more acute when removals into so-called Homelands added to population
density in those areas and increased pressure on the resource base. This resulted in inevitabl~
increases in density with a reduction in the freedom of movement. This, in turn, resulted in severe
environmental pressures like overgrazing, loss ofvegetation and corresponding loss oflivelihood.
The implementation of Betterment Planning schemes, following the recommendations of the
Tomlinson Commission in the early 1950's, the extent of resistance that was experienced in this
Province and its failures are well documented by many authors (A'Bear, 1986, de Wet and
McAllister, 1985 Yawitch, 1982). This type ofa scheme was mostly opposed because it resulted
in the de facto loss of original Land holdings which were subsumed in communal use
arrangements. The tribal peoply ofKwaZulu-Natal were not interested injqst piece ofllmd; they
associated with those particular pieces of land that were used for burying their ancestors. This
cultural and spiritual phenomenon shaped the line ofthinking and entitlements towards land rights.
What has been noticed and traced from the subsequent introduction ofWhite Papers by the past
and present regime is the continued erosion of the inspiration that shaped the institutionalisation
ofaccess to land in KwaZulu-Natal. Because of the former government's attempts to award land
to a selected sector ofcommunities, this was rejected as divisive and as undermining community
strength. The multiple impacts of previous policies have created configurations within which
livelihoods enhancing strategies could be deployed. This is convincingly demonstrated by Hart
(1996) in her Ladysmith and Newcastle case studies. She shows how different aspects of
apartheid policy have coalesced to produce a set of conditions within which strategic land reform
interventions could open up livelihood chances for people resident in the surrounding relocation
areas. Her as:;ertions are most welcome but one is sceptical to view land reform as the supplement
for livelihood, taking into consideration the serious flaws being experienced in the process of
implementation.
5.2 THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Apart from capacity having been undermined by fragmented and centralized systems of service
delivery in the Province, it has also been compromised by the long time that it has taken for
effective systems oflocal government to be instituted within the rural areas. This delay was partly
due to controversies in the Province about the role of traditional leaders in relation to local
government. During the transition process, the Provincial Government took the view that the
interim Constitution required ex offiCio representation of all traditional leaders within local
government bodies (Regional Councils). The Province therefore opted for what was known as
the 'remaining area model' in which elected Regional Councils would serve as local structures.
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A number of difficulties arose from this political compromise. Firstly, in order to ensure that
elected representatives had some say in the Regional Councils as against that of the traditional
leaders, the regional councils consisted of an inordinately large number of councillors, making
it difficult and expensive to convene plenary meetings. Secondly, problems of area representation
arose due to the absence ofward representation. Thirdly, the regional councils have quite limited
capacity and this has circumvented their assuming functions from provincial or national
departments.
There is an increasing consensus within the Province about the role of Regional Councils in
providing services, as is the necessity for a primary level of elected local government in rural
areas. To this end, the Regional Councils have structured themselves so that between four and
six standing committees operate at a local level. This arrangement which was based on the interim
Constitution, incorporated the role oftraditionalleaders in the provision oflocal delivery services.
On the contrary, the new Constitution provides for a role for traditional leadership as an
institution at local level on matters affecting local communities ( s212 (1». These matters have
been confined to issues relating to customary laws and the customs of communities.
The role of traditional leaders in the local government structure is still a bone of contention.
However, as the situation currently prevails, the Constitution rules out a role for a traditional
authority in the local delivery programmes. The implications of this situation are far reaching in
this Province. Although it is not within the scope of this dissertation to discuss the political
implications of,this constitutional development, it is safe to mention that the support of traditional
authorities and other locally-based bodies is crucial if services are to be .made available within
rural areas. This is because service delivery in this Province generally becomes affordable and
acceptable only when communal structures support it. This statement resembles the extent of
discussion that this Province will have to engage with should it adopt the principle of ruling out
traditional authorities in local government structures.
In teasing out the debate around the future role of traditional leaders, McIntosh (1996) tried to
provide a plausible explanation of the current role of traditional authorities: "...traditional
authorities have not provided infrastructure, delivered services or implemented projects. But they
have fulfilled some of the more basic administrative and control functions in rural areas while,
keeping within the financial means of poor communities. Their judicial and dispute resolution
functions have played a vital role in ensuring local stability. More important, traditional
authorities, and the system of traditional tenure on which their power rests, have provided
relatively secure, affordable, ~nd equitable access to land for rural people~'.
What is also striking about this acceptance of traditional authority is that it occurs in a context of
frequent allegations of corruption on the part of particular traditional leaders. Cases are being
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reported throughout the Province where areas of communal land have been handed over by tribal
authorities to developers and private interests in deals which seem to have no legal basis and
which do not always take the interests or rights oflocal people into account (Cross, 1995). The
overall lack offormal tenure rights mean administrative decisions tend to be a substitute for legal
procedure. In the existing legal limbo, administrators at all levels have great discretion: and they
may not be transparent or accountable, or consistent, or coherent. Administrators are also
understandably reluctant to act in cases where they have no clear guidelines. These are the kinds
ofenvironments where bureaucrats and tribal authorities have been tempted to use this vacuum
for their own gain.
5.3 THE DOMINANT MODE OF LAND REFORM INTERVENTION: A Centrally
Driven Application-based Approach
The state's land reform programme, as currently implemented, has tended to generate land reform
projects of a single type. These projects offer very little in terms of livelihood generation. The
development paradigm dominating the policy arena is an application-based system which is largely
driven by the state with or without the market intervention..
The application-based type ofiptervention is basically a demand-driven approach. It involvys the
i ' •
allocation ofresources through the receipt of applications from the communities. In terms of this
approach, the responsibility for accessing infrastructure, services or development resources is
located within civil society. Communities or individuals apply for projects which are approved or
rejected on the basis of specific sectoral or inter-sectoral criteria. This approach ( for example,
Redistribution Programme) has been perpetuated by both the previous and present government
as an appropriate model because it is assumed as encompassing the principles oflocal initiative
and control (people-driven). Although this approach has been applauded as the vehicle for a
consultative mode of implementation, what is emanating from the ground is that projects tend
to be more accessible to better-endowed, well organised communities but less effective in
reaching marginalised sectors of the community.
Two serious problems have emerged with this approach in the land redistribution and other
programme~ (li~e the community-based Public Works Programme). The first of thes~ is a
systematic tendency to bypass local service delivery providers and gove~ent agencies such as
Regional Councils. Although such approaches can facilitate fast track development, they have also
served to obviate inter-sectoral cooperation, local planning and local co-ordination of
development activities. This has resulted in the ad hoc provision of facilities like community halls,
clinics, and land reform settlements with less than adequate provision for ongoing maintenance.
This approach has on occasion also alienated local government bodies and traditional authorities
as well as other government departments responsible for the provision of related services.
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The application-based system is intertwined with the formal delivery system ofthe state. Projects
delivered in this mode have been provided independently of traditional systems and local
development authorities such as Regional Councils. Government departments that have
communicated with those communities directly without liaising with local structures have created
a situation where traditional leaders became defensive and protective of their powers, especially
those relating to land. One ofthe reasons why traditional leaders have found it difficult to engage
with development processes is that they have not been well informed about the land reform
developments, and have not known how to engage with them. In some cases, this has been due
to the poor education (both from external experts and local people) and relative poverty of some
traditional leaders. Also, traditional leaders have not been well served by the government
departments which have taken responsibility for them.
The provincial office of the Department ofLand Affairs has persevered in attempting to draw
other departments and local. government bodies into project selection and project steering
committees. This approach has rarely succeeded in securing financial contributions from either
the province or the municipalities (Regional Councils included). Land redistribution projects have
continued to be viewed with scepticism and are being treated as the exclusive responsibility and
preserve of the Department of Land Affairs. The fact that a national department has been
attempting directly to implement land redistribution projects at the local level is not the sole
explanation for why it has been difficult to secure active support of other departments. Other
critical factors are attributed to poor integration of planning and budgeting, poor local
government structures and disjointed functional portfolios as outlined in the Constitution.
Realisation of livelihood opportunities through land reform will require a somewhat different
approach to current programme implementation. This present system is based on a completely
literal interpretation ofthe concept 'demand-led'. The programme is entirely reactive, and it is this
which results i~ poorly-located, poorly-serviced projects that do not offer livelihood c~ances. A
more strategic and integrated approach to land reform would involve the pro-active structuring
ofprojects for which demand can be anticipated. A more strategic approach would also involve
the building ofpartnerships between institutions and organisations which have something to offer.
Land reform could remain an application-based programme. However, to create and enhance
livelihoods, it is necessary to provide a framework of opportunity within which applications can
be accepted.
5.4 CHAOTIC LAND CONTROLLING SYSTEM
In 1994, the Ingonyama Trust Act located ownership ofland previously owned by the KwaZulu
Government with the King by means ofa statutory trust. This Act contributed to a perception by
many traditional leaders that they own their community land as freehold property, and can be
legitimately sold to outside people including the developers. This Act, was not repealed after the
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1994 elections and it continued to place ownership of all former KwaZulu areas (including the
townships) under the King. However, the constitutional provision of assigning land matters as
national competence compounded the confusion further. The Department of Land Affairs
automatically became the custodian of the Ingonyama Trust Act and in principle, authority to
make laws dealing with land could not be delegated to the provinces. The DepartmentofLand
Affairs therefore assumed the responsibility for land administration of the Ingonyama areas.
The practical implications of this arrangement were that development in the Ingonyama areas
were blocked as there was no administrative support that was in place to implement the
legislation. Warlords used this legal vacuum by taking control of land, illegally giving land to
people who become their followers and then withholding access to services and land from people
reluctant to cooperate. Many squatters driven by warlords mushroomed in the townships and
authorities (provincial and local governments) could not act on these squatters because they were
not landowners. The government did not take action to make clear who owned tribal authority
land, or to stop this land being sold off The chances of corruption were and still are enormous
as long as the tenurial issues in tribal areas are unclear.
Permissions to Occupy ( PTOs ) in the former KwaZulu government were issued under the
authority oftraditional leaders, acting on behalf of the government. They took the form of actual
documents in the case ofpermanent facilities such as schools, clinics, halls, etcetera. The relevant
government department then issued the certificate after the application had been recommended
by the appro{'riate magistrate. For ordinary community members, the transaction was secur,ed by
the community at large. Both formal developments and ordinary land transfers in communities are
still going ahead without any legal base. Developers and traditional leaders appear to be
concluding deals using invalid PTOs. Cross (1995) cartooned this type of arrangement as
characters walking off the edge of a cliff with their eyes closed, who don't actually fall till they
look down and see that they are standing on fresh air. As a result, many developments have been
completely blocked by the uncertainty around tenure, resulting in delays of a year and more on
specific projects.
There are many examples in KwaZulu-Natal ofland being sold to commercial developers as well
as to private individuals looking for cheap holiday properties. These transfers seem to be taking
place without community members being fully consulted and money is rarely accounted for. In
reported cases, there is little, if any, benefit returned to community members which lose rights.
The Depart?'lent of Land Affairs seems to be failing to conceptualise the extent of the land
problems that require immediate attention. The present land reform projects are not addressing
these problems, and land in the rural areas continue to be allocated and sold outside the strict
limits of the law under confused conditions.
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The weakness of the present land system is also destroying the legitimacy of the newly started
land reform projects because the precedent that has been created in the existing rural areas creates
a fertile ground for future warlords to hijack the process for their personal gain. In other words,
the risk ofhaying no clear legislative guidelines, and the snail's pace at which attempts to tackle
these problems taking place will result in this informalisation running wild and being used by
powerful people to build and secure positions ofdomination. As mentioned, warlords are popping
up in many areas and seem to be turning community members into tenants. Anyone who can claim
control of land by force can do the same, whilst authorities at provincial and local government
level are unable to act or prevent it because the competency for dealing with land matters rests
with the national Department ofLand Affairs.
5.5 SUFFOCATING BUREAUCRACY
Centralised, fragmented and uncoordinated interventions have undermined the potential for rural
people to benefit from the development process. The provincial and national departments have
tried to provide services directly to localities, either by using their own field staff or by making
use of consultants. Numerous difficulties have been encountered by the Department of Land
Affairs in attempting to effect a coordinated approach. Their senior staff do not know the local
conditions, and cannot respond quickly in terms of local priorities. Cqnfusion arises where
communities have to access different officials for different problems and needs.
What is still happening is that different departments have established their own forums at a local
level to consult with communities about their service delivery needs. This fragmented approac~
to service delivery is dividing communities in the image of the state and is leading to unnecessary
competition with local government structures. As the situation currently prevails, rural KwaZulu-
Natal is not immune to institutional incompetencies and poor mechanisms of enabling different
government departments to deliver services and development resources in a co-ordinated and
integrated manner.
Provincial and national government departments should shift away from the direct delivery of
services towards enabling local government structures to become the direct suppliers of local
services, and .the coordinators of local development activities. This is consistent with the
, 1, \
Constitution, which makes local government the body which takes ultimate responsibility for
service delivery. It is therefore critical that community-based delivery systems that are being
developed by provincial and national government departments should be built into emerging local
government departments. The setting up of parallel and competing systems by government
departments should be avoided.
A mechanism for involving traditional leaders in development activities, is their ex-offiCio
representation within Regional Councils. However, this also has shortcomings. The Regional
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Councils are at a level which exceeds the area ofjurisdiction of any particular traditional leader.
In fact neither traditional leaders nor individual elected councillors have been in a position to,
influence decision-making significantly, given the number of councillors within the Regional
Councils. Greater opportunities for a more positive role for traditional leaders may be found
within the emerging local government system.
5.6 FRAGMENTATION OF RURAL FINANCIAL SERVICES
The salient feature of financial services (and markets) in South Mrica's rural areas is a stark
institutional split between credit facilities and savings facilities. These two poles are the product
of the previous government where rural financial services were provided in politically strategic
ways rather than in a developmentally driven approach. The current stark polarisation of land
reform projects between non-economic settlements and fully fledged commercial opportunities
is parallelled by, and partially derives from the polarisation in land acquisition programme in terms
ofwhich beneficiaries can acquire a R 15 000 settlement grant. What will most rural people want
to do with a windfall ofR 15 OOO? Use it to raise another R 35 000 to go into farming or find
ways of using it to extend the house or pay school fees for their children? This approach treats
land reform as a cost and not as an opportunity, and therefore a cost to be minimised. The
alternative to purchasing land through the market using finance raised through a commercial bank,
or land acquisition through commercial farmer settlement schemes initiated by the private sector,
proved to be unforthcoming in the rural areas.
The primary institutions and organisations which have provided credit facilities in both the
commercial sector and the former KwaZulu areas have been government departments and
parastatals (the Agricultural Credit Board, the Land and Agricultural Bank, and the provincial
Development Corporations). Some of these institutions have either not been activated or, until
very recently, have been of far less importance than the credit providing facilities. The fac,t that
so many financjng and development agencies have been involved in the. province in the past,
clearly outlines the complexity of previous institutional arrangements. People in the rural areas
have access to commercial banking facilities through the ubiquitous presence of commercial banks
in small towns. It therefore essential that national development agencies and parastatals restrict
their funding programmes to the financing of service undertakings, within clear parameters.
Bames and Morris (1997) are supported in their assertion that the establishment of a single
development agency that deals with service delivery requirements in rural KwaZulu-Natal would
go a long way towards creating a sound development-oriented institutional environment in the
province. However, this one single development agency raises a question of domination by
monopolies that are already existing in the rural areas. These monopolies are antithetical to the
establishment of a sound development environment and it is therefore appropriate to channel all
the funding resources to one structure in a form of a local authority, that is, the Regional
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Councils. The role ofthe Regional Councils as the municipality of rural areas would address the
issue of monopoly and also synergise the development agenda for these multitudes of financial
agencies. Many of these agencies have a variety of development portfolios, and the Regional
Council would be able to harmonise and blend them with its constituency needs and thereby
ensure the maximum utilisation, and equitable spread of available scarce resources.
6. AREAS FOR CONSIDERATION
The institutional relationships and powers ofthe national, provincial and local administrations and
of traditional authorities will probably remain undefined, and will result to chaotic and chronic
conflict. In legal terms, the worst possible outcome is for formal and informal institutional
arrangements to be left to the administrators without building in the checking and balancing
mechanisms. The goal offraming an enabling environment is not only to be left to administrative
discretion ifauthorities want to achieve a sound, just, coherent and consistent system with a firm
base.
South African rural areas are receiving prominent attention from the government delivery
programmes and it is vital to clearly define the legitimate position of traditional leaders taking into
consideration the applicable legislation and constitutionality aspects. Meeting constitutional
equality provisions might draw some resistance from traditional leaders, but any legislation which
avoids the Constitution's principles would immediately be open to challenge in a court of law. It
has been suggested that the roles and responsibilities of the various componen~s of the
institutional partnerships, and the link between these components, require clarification. Confusion
about or misinterpretation of these roles, responsibilities and linkages may have adverse
implications not only for democracy in South Africa but also for the successful implementation
ofland reform programmes.
The challenge for the Department ofLand Affairs is to set in place structures necessary for other
pillars ofland reform: structural and institutional networking, and consolidating some progressive
processes already initiated. The proposed land reform process is inadequate to introduce a
fundamental programme to restructure power relations in the allocation of responsibilities and
control of land. Apart from entrenching the property rights, the Constitution seems to limit the
scope for involvement of provincial and local spheres of governments, instead of empowering
them in the land reform process. The land reform programme and development process should
also strive foreffective involvement oflocal people and incorporation oflocal knowledge into
development pl~nning and implementation.
57
CHAPTER FIVE
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN KWAZULU NATAL
1. INTRODUCTION
I
Since, the advent of the democratic national government and democratic local government,
efforts have been made to strengthen and empower local government. Municipalities are seen as
being in the front line of service delivery and development. The transformation of local
governments have been finally ushered by the 1998 White Paper on Local Government which
entrenched this trend toward developmental local government, an important function of which is
control over land use (Pycroft, 1998). A central argument in this dissertation contends that unless
each municipality has executive authority over the use of land within its area ofjurisdiction, the
constitutional role of local government as a sphere of government in its own right remains
unfulfilled. National legislation has sought mechanisms to promote local autonomy, but within
defined parameters that ensure that municipalities are developmental. It has not been easy to
balance the two needs: on the one hand, establishing national norms and standards for the
performance ofmunicipalities, and a mechanism by which national and provincial government can
\ ,
impose sanctions on municipalities that fail to fulfil their development mandate, and on the other
hand, protecting and promoting autonomous local councils.
As in many other countries which have been confronted with the challenge of governing in
contexts where there has been a radical break from the past (post-colonial Mrica and post-
apartheid South Africa), while it was necessary to demonstrate that a fundamental break from the
past was being made, it soon became clear that this cannot be done by ignoring the past and
devoting too much energy to the construction of grand visions of desired futures. Once it was
accepted that there is no escaping the realities of the past as a starting point for formulating
realistic short and medium term strategies, the age-old issues that have challenged the most
capable development planners soon emerged.
Although the thirty year old tradition of policy analysis evolved the body of knowledge that was
used by public managers to build institutions and methods for governing countri~s, it was
development planning that has generated the conceptions, approaches and institutional strategies
for managing the development process. It is most telling that Michael Todaro's famous text on
development planning commences with a quote from Abraham Lincoln who said
" ifwe couldfirst know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could do b~tter
judge what to do, and how to do it"
58
How different this is to those who think: it is best to first reject the past, set a future vision, and
only then work out "where we are" as a basis for working out "what to do", and "how to do it".
The overall aim of this chapter is to expose key policy issues that would add value to existing
empirical experience in a way that would enhance capacity to "better judge what to do". This
approach is premised on the notion that there is no one correct way to do things because ~f the
complexities that are specific to each context. But it is believed that capacity for sound judgement
in specific contexts and situations is better than DLA technical solutions (drafted in Pretoria) that
are deemed to be applicable to all contexts.
Market liberalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa has always been a contested issue. Under colonialism
and in the early independence period planning failed to redress underdevelopment (Friedmann,
1992) and became a largely ideological activity intended to legitimate the colonial and post-
colonial state. The introduction of a market liberalisation model valorised the market as the only
genuine means of effective development. The failure of statist, top-down planning was used to
legitimise a market-driven model ofdevelopment in which individual'goal orientation' is intended
to overcome the excessive normativism of previous efforts. As the introductory quotation
suggests, this process of development planning has major implications for knowing how to
integrate land reform process with the legislative planning framework for KwaZulu-Natal. Hence,
this chapter attempts to examine whether and to what extent KwaZulu-Natal, as an example, has
been restructured to effect efficient local service delivery in a co-ordinated and integrated manner.
KwaZulu-Natal is an instructive case study because it has been at the forefront in introducing a
model ofintegrating different planning and development legislations and linking them through the
common thread ofdevelopment planning so that they all work in support of each other and strive
to achieve sustainable development in all spheres. In the quinquennium period, an immense
amount has been achieved and many ofthe initiatives which were just concepts in 1994, have now
started to come to fruition. The key feature ofthe progress made thus far is an endeavour to work. ,
towards an ambitious decentralisation of planning and development powers. This chapter
therefore begins with an examination ofplanning paradigms within the neo-liberal development
model. The second section briefly outlines the planning legislative framework in KwaZulu-Natal
and how it integrated the national planning requirements. The final section explores the need for
establishing principles to guide locational decisions of land reform and analysis of the spatial
development issues facing rural people, and of the current spatial aspects of service delivery.
2. MARKET - BASED APPROACH VERSUS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS:
OXYMORON OR RED HERRING?
One argument in support ofplanning (government intervention) is based on the concept of market
failure to reach the poor sectors of communities. This position states that since monopolies are
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rampant and restrictive, externalities are ubiquitous (Richardson and Gordon, 1993) and the
allocative efficiency of the market system is rarely achieved. Hence, planners must intervene to
put things right. An alternative, slightly more pro-market argument, posits that markets achieve
a high degree of economic efficiency but often at the expense of equity. This view holds since
most allocative choices involve a trade-offbetween efficiency and equity, planners must intervene
in to achieve an appropriate degree of redistribution. In this view, markets attend to efficiency,
while planners look after equity.
Neither of these arguments are convincing, both greatly exaggerate the prevalence of market
failure. The idea oftrade-off with markets looking after efficiency and planners watching out for
equity is equally irrelevant in the contemporary planning and development issues in South Africa.
It is therefore a fantasy for the South African land policy to hold a view that land reform is purely
based on market-driven principles. So many market versus government driven approaches debates
set up a false dichotomy between market and state programmes. A spectrum of systems rather
than bipolarity implies that the choice between market solutions and planning interventions is
irrelevant. The real issues are when to intervene, what types of intervention will minimize
inefficiencies and inequities, and the effectiveness of the intervention (BaneIjee, 1993).
Given these considerations, policy makers should attempt to decide the appropriate scope of
planning and regulatory approaches? The first step is to identitY when public intervention is
justified, and the second step is to evaluate the conditions under which interventionist strategies
are less practical than regulatiop. Indeed one ofthe central themes of market advocacy i~ distrust
and distaste for the political process in a democratic society(Rapley, 1994) from which planning
(in the public sector) derives its legitimacy. This negativity sees freedom exclusively in terms of
the independence of the market from interference by others including the government and its
institutions. This view is symptomatic of the deep and fundamental cognitive dissonance the
marketists have with the idea ofgovernment intervention.In contrast to marketism, the ideology
that informs the market fetish and is unequivocally anti-planning advocacy is not anti-market
(Rapley, 1994). Planning, even in the limited sense is not meant to undermine market economy
and in fact market is the medium for conduct of planning in all liberal democracies.
If the practice of planning is examined, as it should be, from a humanistic ethic (that is, if it is
judged in terms of the degree to which it contributes positively to the lives of the majority of
people and not just to elites or minority interest groups), it becomes apparent that the fundamental
premises and c9ncepts upon which it is based are flawed and are contributing significantly to the
poor performance ofland reform programmes. The current planning approaches are also entirely
inappropriate to the realities of the KwaZulu-Natal context, particularly in terms of resource
rationalisation. Their outcomes are non-sustainable and they need to be rethought and
reconstituted from first principles.
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This discussion suggests that market-based approaches to social and environmental problems are
sometimes effective, but often of dubious value. They do not necessarily weaken the need for an
administrative bureaucracy. In reality, the market approach may require more oversight in some
cases. Market approaches may allow greater efficiency in resource allocation, but the distributive
effects may be questionable, since these approaches seem to benefit minorities at the expense of
the large proportion ofpoor communities. The Kenyan and Zimbabwean experiences showed that
equity goals and other values that underlie the authority of public institutions are typically not
achiefed by approaches. The creation of new property rights engenders many serious moral,
ethical, and legal dilemmas. Alexander (1992) once mentioned that the market can be 'blind and
deaf' for it does not have to guide, but society needs a guide. Planning must have eyes and ears
for it is the guide.
3. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: A TREND TOWARDS DECENTRALISATION
In 1994, the Forum for Effective Planning and Development (FEPD) was given the responsibility
of ensuring that "development planning" was implemented in all spheres of government. The
Forum defined development planning as follows: A partiCipatory process to integrate economic,
sectoral, spatial, social, institutional, environmental andfiscal strategies in order to support the
optimal allocation of scarce resources between sectors and geographical areas and across
populations, in a manner thatprovides sustainable growth, security and the empowerment ofthe
poorandmarginalisedcommunities"(Department ofLand Affairs, 1997: 3). KwaZulu-Natal not
only subscribed to the definition, but participated in the national initiatives aimed at implementing
development planning and has developed a vigorous provincial planning legislation which aims
to strengthen the role ofmunicipalities in the coordination of integrated development.
3.1 Communicative Land Reform Planning
The past several decades have witnessed an evolution in methods and processes of development
planning worldwide. These changes have to a large extent, parallelled the widening
conceptualisation of development itself Development, in the narrower conceptualisation of
'modernisation theory', is defined merely under the auspices of economic growth (Banerjee,
1993). Over ,t~e time, the con~ept of development has been broadened, albeit not universaJIy to
more comprehensive views of social and human development. This was done by including
concepts and objectives such as 'redistribution with growth', the satisfaction of a variety of 'basic
human needs, the protection ofcivil and political human rights, the pursuit of economic and social
rights, and the use of environmentally appropriate and sustainable technology' (Innes, 1998).
Similarly, development planning methods have evolved and now commonly include community
participation as opposed to mere reliance on outside experts, technicians and planning
professional.
61
While there is now a wider consensus on the importance of participation in development,
participation also evokes a wide variety of methodological practices and objectives. This is
necessary, arguably, given the diverse cultural, political and socio-economic settings in which it
is employed (Martin, 1995). For example, participation in land reform planning processes is
encouraged in order to ensure that initiatives respond to the root causes poverty, and basic
needs, rather than addressing merely the symptoms ofpoverty. The international literature stresses
that participation is pursued as both means and ends (Healey, 1992). As an end, it is the fulfilment
ofa basic human need to be part ofthe processes that shape one's life. It is sought to move away
from dependency to self-reliance. As a means, participation can attain other political, social and
economic objectives. It can promote sustainability and replication, reduce project costs, and take
advantage oflocal practices and technologies that are suited for the environment or local human
capacities
In South Africa and particularly KwaZulu-Natal, guidance and justification for participatory
development can be found in many laws and policy documents (Nene, 1997). Among other
objectives of local government, Section 152 of the 1996 Constitution specifies the promotion of
social and economic development and the involvement of communities and community
organisations in matters oflocal government. Chapter seven of the White Paper on the National
Reconstruction and Development Programme states that "structured consultation processes at all
spheres ofgovernment will be introduced to ensure participation in policy making and planning,
as well as project implementation". Similarly, Section 10 G ofthe Local Government Transition
Act of 1996 directs municipalities to annually report to and receive comments from commu.nities
regarding development plans.
The Development Facilitation Act of 1995 emphasises community organisation and development
forums as vehicles for community participation. Furthermore, the Provincial Planning and
Development Act of 1998 of KwaZulu Natal calls for the establishment of community
development structures to facilitate public involvement in planning and development. Lastly,
while cautioning municipalities to find the right balance between effective delivery and
participation, the 1998 National White Paper on Local Government stresses that such government
is uniquely placed to promote active participation of citizens in budgeting, planning and
implementation of development.
What are the implications of these goals for land reform planning? These policy documents
demonstrate that the nature of land reform planning by which the process is executed is essential
to embedding it in understandings and institutions. A planning process carried out by presumably
neutral experts who work outside and apart from the political and bureaucratic processes through
which policy gets made, does not become embedded in the institutions or the local
understandings. It will become what Innes (1998) called " intellectual capital " or shared
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knowledge, only if there is plenty of talk about the meaning of the information, its accuracy and
its implication. Planning does not influence unless it is characterised by a socially constructed and
shared understanding created in a web of communicative and interactive process involving the
policy makers and the beneficiaries.
Which sphere ofgovernment is better located to make land reform planning to be understood as
communicative action? Discussions with many researchers and officials for the DLA, are now
fully realising that the local government structure is better placed, to develop a matching concept
of rationality that can provide an ethical and legitimate stance for planners whilst ensuring that
land reform projects are socially meaningful, appropriate for the local context and practically
worthwhile. This premise, therefore makes it necessary to ask whether South Africa's existing
planning policy strengthens or weakness efforts to decentralise decision making to the local
sphere ofgovernment.
3.2 Developmental Local Government: Prospects for Integrating Land Reform?
The launch of the White Paper on Local Government in Cape Town in March 1998 marks an
important stage in the transformation of local government in South Africa. The inequities of
apartheid local government have been well documented, as have the development backlogs
created by years oflocalised racial division (Paycroft, 1998). Section 153 of the Constitution
explains the developmental duties of municipalities, requiring each municipality to structure and
manage its administration and its budgeting and planning process to give priority to the basic
needs of the community (Constitution, 1996). The White Paper further defines the concept of
developmental local government by identifying four interrelated aspects: maximising economic
growth and social development; integrating and coordinating the development activities of other
role-players; more importantly, democratising development by facilitating and encouraging the
fullest possible participation by citizens; and leading and learning, giving councils a key role in
building social and capital and encouraging local solutions to local problems (Ministry of
Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, 1998).
This is a remarkable departure from the more traditional approach to governance as it identifies
a central role for integrated development planning. Integrated development planning seeks to
position municipalities at the centre of a complex matrix of organisations operating within the
council's area ofjurisdiction, where they will take responsibility for managing both horizontal and
vertical dimensions of integration. The horizontal integration places responsibilities to
developmental council to facilitate and co-ordinate service delivery, poverty alleviation strategies
and local economic development.
Although local governments are expected to manage its budget and planning process, what is
happening within the implementation of land reform reflects the persistence of traditional
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approach of s~eking to impose a hierarchy of tiers, with national government playin& the most
important role, a:nd local government frequently operating merely as the local delivery arm of the
central government. Budgeting of various projects impacting on the development needs of the
municipalities is done without any consultation with those municipalities nor allowing any benefit
of changing the financial allocation as and when is required. The whole process is still and will
remain (so long as a narrow interpretation ofland matters as an exclusive national competence
persists) planned, budgeted and implemented by DLA provincial offices without any meaningful
participation by other spheres ofgovernment.
Indeed, the developmental council, through vertical integration, plays a pre-eminent role in
determining how the other spheres ofgovernment will operate within the municipality's area. The
developmental council is therefore a far more proactive and significant development agent than
the previous types of municipal government experienced in South Africa. The Constitution has
deliberately opted for a more autonomous form of local government with distinct power and
functions which makes to paint a gloomy picture about integrated land reform planning process.
The continued existence ofDLA's traditional approach fails to portray the intention of moving
away from the centralised driven approach and thus imposed a hostile environment towards the
land reform projects particularly at the provincial and local governments.
4. SYNOPTIC UNDERSTANDING OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING WITHIN
LAND REFORM PROCESS IN KWAZULU-NATAL
In an effort to secure maximum return from the limited development resources at its disposal, the
provincial government in KwaZulu-Natal has sought alternative techniques to ensure that
development resources are managed efficiently, wasteful duplication of effort is minimised, and
the three spheres ofgovernment work in concert. A coherent policy environment was seen as an
important prerequisite for eff~ctive development programmes such as land reform. Tl)is policy
environment, Involving interrelated, and mutually reinforcing sectoral, spatial and institutional
dimensions, was presented in a comprehensive report known as the Provincial Growth and
Development Strategy (pG&DS)
4.1 Provincial Growth and Development Strategy
The Province has already compiled its Provincial Development Plan, that is, the Provincial
Growth and Development Strategy (PG&DS). The Strategy set out the vision, principles and
seven programmes which highlight what should be done to achieve economic growth,
development and redistribution of resources in KwaZulu-Natal for the next twenty-five years
(Robinson, 1998). The collective objective of the PG&DS is to secure high levels of economic
growth whilst simultaneously ensuring that the quality oflife for all the inhabitants of the Province
is systematically improved. This overarching objective is to be achieved through the co-ordinated
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implementation of seven interrelated programmes.
Although land reform and its implementation is technically a national programme, this Province
identified this objective as one ofthe critical elements ofProgramme four: "Addressing the Needs
ofthe Poor". This programme selected land reform as the key for reducing poverty and assisting
in promoting the transfer and use ofassets to the poor people and through the provision of social
welfare. Since the Province has included land reform in their provincial plan, it therefore compels
the institutional instruments of the administration to forge links with all the institutions involved
in the implementation of land reform.
4.2 Formulation of an Appropriate Spatial Framework
Programme Six of the PG&DS is the Provincial Spatial Growth and Development Framework
(pSG&DF) which sets out where growth, development and redistribution could and should take
place. It sets out the overall spatial distribution of development to respond to the spatial
implications and synergy arising frorp the development strategy and other policies and to set
frameworks and co-ordinate planning. The PSG&DF outlines clear spatial parameters for
development in the Province's rural areas. These include a hierarchy of service delivery centres,
the development of small towns in conjunction with their hinterlands, a focus on minor
development corridors, and spill- over benefits from major growth corridors due to economic
links and oscillating migrating patterns.
Strategies to realise opportunities for rural areas include the successful implementation of land
reform programmes in this Province. A principle which was identified as the cornerstone of this
strategy was the creation of areas where rationalisation of public investment can be sustained in
focused spatial development, while providing basic services as a fundamental right (Robinson,
1998). It was suggested in the PSG&DF that locational decisions (of land reform projects) should
be based on an analysis of the spatial development issues facing people who are applying for
assistance (demand-side), and of the current spatial aspects of service delivery (supply-side
effects). The PSG&DF was drafted in a manner that can respond to demand and supply-side
issues by taking decisions to locate public sector investments in a particular manner (Robinson
and McCarthy, 1998). Land reform projects are not using this opportunity and the only thing
driving the location of projects is where the 'willing seller' has agreed to sell the property. The
spatial implications and objectives of providing an investment framework for a better integrated
spatial structure that would enable beneficiaries to have better access to services, and provide and
promote the re~sation ofeconomic potential, are severely compromised. The resultant sitqation
is that the government fails to create a framework for further investment and reduce the
imbalances in the provision of infrastructure and services in a co-ordinated manner.
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4.3 White Paper on Integrated Rural Development
Programme Four of the PG&DS: 'Addressing the needs of the poor' influenced the Provincial
Cabinet to initiate the drafting of the White Paper on Integrated Rural Development. The policy
builds upon and complements the PG&DS by identifying policy instruments and specific strategies
through which the economic and social development of rural areas in the Province' might be
realised. The vision for rural development which underpins the policy proposals has a number of
elements, such as, resolution of existing contradictions between civil and customary power
through identifying complementary roles for civil and customary systems of governance, and
integrated provision of services and development resources (Vaughan and McIntosh, 1998).
For the first time in South Africa and KwaZulu-Natal in particular, this policy document realised
the need for complementing roles for civil and customary systems for the benefit of effective
delivery oflocal services. This viewpoint is now alluded to by many scholars such as Cousin's
(1998) when he proposed a systematic integration offormal and informal institutions. What is
required though are strategies of building and empowering rural local governments. This critical
pre-condition can be developed only ifprovincial and national government departments shift away
from the present practice ofdelivering services ( for example, land reform) directly to rural areas
without invol~g the very 'natural' localised structures. Vaughan and McIntosh (1998) proposed
that government departments should use the local structures and buildl their capacity as the
managers and co-ordinators of the services delivery and development activities.
Another complementary pre-requisite for an effective and targeted land reform programme was
identified as a decentralised and rationalised delivery system. The empowered local structures
were seen as vehicles for providing a spectrum of opportunities for a range of beneficiaries. This
will require the pro-active structuring of programmes and projects for which demand can be
anticipated rather than the present reactive approach. This approach was therefore championed
in the White Paper as the foundation for addressing institutional, social, economic and
environmental aspects that would contribute to sustainable development of rural areas in this
Province. This implies that the national departments such as Department ofLand Affairs should
develop land reform strategies which mesh with the PG&DS as well as locational decisions as
outlined in the PSG&DF.
5. IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN KWAZULU-NATAL
Following the introduction of the interim Constitution, Act NO.22 of 1993, a new statutory
environment emerged which included inter alia a change in the scales of planning to more
appropriately reflect planning at the provincial, regional, metropolitan and local level. It is within
this context that planning organisations find themselves, with all Municipalities (in this Province,
this includes Regional Councils) needing to meet the requirements as prescribed by the plethora
ofdevelopment planning legislation applicable to KwaZulu-Natal, as well as other non-statutory
requirements which the Province has adopted. In trying to clarify the confusion that was caused
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by disjointed nature of planning legislative requirements, this Province pulled together all
planning requirements in a single planning mechanism under the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and
Development Act 1998 (Act No.5 of 1998).
5.1 PROVINCIAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT (PDA)
The PDA brought about clarity to the planning arena. Its intention was to establish one piece of
planning legislation which would be applicable throughout the Province and to dovetail the
implementation ofthe Act with the implementation of the Development Facilitation Act (Act No.
67 of 1995) (DFA). The concept ofa planning hierarchy (Provincial, Regional, Metropolitan and
Local development) is introduced where all plans will be awarded statutory status. The notion
of "one Municipality, one Plan" is promoted, in order to achieve integrated, co-ordinated and
sustainable development (Haselau, 1998). The PDA regulations (higWighting the product and
process of development planning) after they have been adopted by the provincial Cabinet, will
require all Municipalities to prepare Development Plans (Chapter IV) as statutory documents
for the relevant local authority. The level of each detail to which each of the components are
investigated would need to be established by the Municipality concerned.
The entire Act is based upon principles that are fully influenced by the principles of the DFA.
Other crucial components of any Development Plan include the need for Municipalities to
address the land use management and control element of development planning, as well as
monitoring and review of the entire process. This statutory planning requirement binds all
development agents, including the organs of the state to implement development initiatives
within the framework of the agreed and accepted Development Plan. For example, land reform
is deemed to be a national responsibility of the Department ofLand Affairs, this Act binds the
department to apply to the relevant authority for the implementation of that project. The
authorities w;ould be expected to use the development plan as the guiding decision tool and follow
all procedures that are applicable to other development agents. This principle of binding even the
state forces the DLA to implement land reform in KwaZulu-Natal within the parameters of the
Development plan of that region. This approach serves a vital role in the process of integration
of government functions and assists in reaching a common approach to the regional problems,
compromises, trade-offs, co-ordination and joint investments.
5.1.1 Aggregation and disaggregation
It is increasingly recognised that in situations where enormous challenges are faced, as with South
Africa's reconstruction, the principle of disaggregation - breaking down very large problems into
handleable bites, is fundamental. In this regard, the statutory development plans serve as one
appropriate point at which national and provincial policies and strategies are given substance. The
regions are able to place the national programmes within its ability and resources, and implement
those projects that are within their programmed action. The reverse applies in a process of,
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aggregation. Needs and priorities identified on the ground are a primary input into the allocation
of resources by higher levels ofgovernment. The regions are therefore playing an important role
in technically integrating inputs from various stakeholders in the region in such a way that these
inputs are mutually supportive and consistent. In this manner, development plans are an important
tool for locally driven process in drawing up and monitoring provincial and national programmes.
The implementation ofland reform through this process of binding all organs of the state is going
to be most influential in changing the contemporary approaches of the DLA. The Municipalities
with their statutory powers will be able to back their decisions. However, it should be mentioned
that the principles ofDFA as they apply also in this Act, stipulates that the development plan is
not seeking to be comprehensive or pretending to make decisions about everything. Rather it
should seek to identify and implement a framework for the minimum possible set of strong priority
programmes necessary to generate a rich and more equitable spread of opportunities for further
investments. Clearly, this means that development (such as land reform) is not a condition that
can be imposed exclusively from either above or below. It must be a process that facilitates the
involvement of all people (and particularly disadvantaged groups) in the decision-making
mechanisms that have impact on their lives. The outcome of this participative process should be
a plan which offers innovative choices and the freedom to make these choices. After all, this is
what the authors of the definition of development planning envisaged. The whole emphasis was
and is on proactive planning where a development plan defines the preconditions for opportunities
around which people exercise their choices. The placing of this iterative and integrative process
of planning in ii legislative framework is done by this Act.
5.1.2 Converging Point of Vertical and Horizontal Integration
This development plan acts as a point of integration of government activity, which takes two
forms: vertical and horizontal integration. The vertical integration of activities of different spheres
of government involves integration of line departments that have broadly similar or
complementary functions. This Act has given Municipalities statutory powers to demand and
force all line function departments to budget or implement their activities after they have taken
into consideration all the activities required to sustain that particular project. The Department of
Land Affairs will be technically forced to liaise with the region concerned before budgetary
allocation of that specific project is considered. Gone are the times when DLA would plan the
project and only start to involve the Municipality after budget allocations have been done and
specific location already agreed upon. The Horizontal integration is also equally important for the
integrating of activities of v~rious line departments at the same level. This involves various
I
sectoral activities of different line departments that are required to complement the project. The
DLA planning approach expects the Municipalities to foot the bill for the provision of
infrastructure without providing any financial assistance. This kind of 'unfunded mandate' would
be able to be detected at an early stage of the process because the Act compels government
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departments to work within the Municipalities and only initiate those projects that have been
approved.
CONCLUSION
This discussion ofthe implementation ofdevelopment planning in KwaZulu-Natal has shown that
the statutory development plans provided in the PDA, are not about producing 'blue prints' or
standardized, comprehensive plans. Nor is it fundamentally about solving problems, although
problems are obviously addressed; an approach based largely on problem solving can only result
in perpetuating a reactive style of planning. It is conspicuous that the PDA forces all spheres of
government to engage in partnerships in the planning process- from issue identification and
direction setting through to implementation. This implies that land reform in KwaZulu-Natal
would have to be planned and implemented within the prioritised needs of that particular
Municipality. Locational decisions will no longer only be influenced by the agreement between
the 'willing seller' and the 'willing buyer' concept. Locational decisions will be taken by the
responsible authority after it has used the development plan as a decision making tool in
influencing its decisions. It is therefore apparent that DLA should start to work with the provincial
and local spheres of this Province so that its approach can be accommodated in the preparation
ofthese plans. By implication, the process must be as inclusive and participatory as possible and
it needs to be informed and guided by the responsible authorities as they are the legal statutory
bodies for their areas ofjurisdiction.
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CHAPTER SIX
OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF LAND REFORM
INKWAZULU-NATAL: ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES
The developing world, Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, is not short ofideas, but it is deficient
in the ability to implement these ideas (author).
1. INTRODUCTION
The discussion in this chapter is based on earlier assessments in this dissertation which
demonstrated that while a fundamental break from the past is crucial, it is clear that this cannot
be done by ignoring the past and devoting too much energy to the construction ofgrand visions
ofdesired futures. Hall (1998) in her assessment of land reform implementation in many African
countries discovered that efforts to redistribute rural land to the landless, have tended to both,
reinforce existing forms of inequality, and given rise to new dimensions of inequality within
beneficiary communities. The gap between vision and reality is a regular and patterned trend in
rural development and land reform programmes. Whether defined as the problem of getting work
done, or securing compliance with other spheres of governments, Post (1997) mentioned that the
extent of the disjuncture between aim and effect cannot be explained merely as a shortfall from
projected targets but must be understood as a failure of the policy itself
The specific focus in this chapter is on institutional constraints negatively affecting the
implementation of land reform in KwaZulu-Natal. The term 'implementation problem' is
preferred in referring to any land policy with a proven record, no matter how much has been
achieved. On one level, it refers to the missing link (Morah, 1996) or the myriad ofgeneric factors
that act to constrain the optimal achievement of land policy goals. On another, it refers to the
objective reality of a land reform programme in terms of both the constitutional constraints and, .
ofbudgetary cuts experienced by provincial and local governments. However, where does policy
end and implementation and its concomitant problems begin? This debate is not important for this
exercise, so long as whatever view is preferred is sufficiently broad to recognise and address all
the contending perspectives. That is why the process is going to be treated as encompassing
everything that follows between policy formation and final outcome.
This does not mean that attempts to separate policy from implementation are wholly irrelevant,
because viewing implementation as a series of logical steps from intention to action also provides
a useful heuristic device through which to identify issues and questions about what is going on.
The point to be made, as captured by Hill (1981) is that 'it is unrealistic to expect the two
phenomena to be clearly distinguished'. The one clear indication is that, in practice, policy is not
made exclusively by legislators, and administrators, in carrying out directives handed down by
I ,
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politicians, they do not carry out the directives as specified. Administrators make policy at all
levels of organisational hierarchy, not just people at the top.
This chapter attempts to categorise the scholarship of implementation, by raising current
implementation problems which can be used as a base for constitutional principles and also
recognising the importance of locally driven land reform implementation programmes. The main
objective ofthis analysis is to provide a comprehensive outline of development impediments with
particular reference to KwaZulu-Natal. A brief background for each illustrative case study is
provided. This is followed by specific obstacles and reference to specific examples.
2. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES
The Minister ofLand Affairs has been entrusted by the President with the national land portfolio
and has been assigned numerous land related legislative measures for his administration. He,
together with his Department of Land Affairs is entrusted with setting national land policy,
embodying it in legislation, establishing land programmes, and implementing and funding them
(DLA, 1996). Two serious problems have emerged with this constitutional provision. The first
ofthese is a systematic tendency to bypass local service providers and government agencies in the
implementation of land reform projects. Although such approaches can facilitate fast track
development, they have also served to obviate inter-sectoral cooperation, local planning and local
co-ordination ofdevelopment activities. This has resulted in the ad hoc provision of facilities like
community halls, clinics, roads and settlements with less than adequate provision for ongoing
maintenance. This approach has on many occasions alienated local government bodies and
traditional authorities as well as other line function departments responsible for the provision of
'after care' services.
The fact that a national department has been directly attempting implementation of land
redistribution projects at the local level, it is not the sole explanation why many land reform
projects in KwaZulu-Natal have found it difficult to secure the active support of the related
departments. The reason is, partly, that some of the provincial departments and local authorities
(especially Regional Councils) have not viewed the land reform process as contributing towards
fulfilling their own agenda. As a result, most land reform projects are still viewed as the exclusive
responsibility and preserve of the Department ofLand Affairs.
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2.1 NGOTSHE ACCORD: LOUWSBERG DISTRICT: ZULULAND REG. COUNCIL
The Ngotshe Accord (Map 2) is a classical example of policy inconsistency and the overall lack
of an appropriate legal framework. The officials of the Department of Land Affairs used their
administrative decisions and discretions to substitute for legal procedures. There are five tribal
authorities involved in this accord: Buthelezi B; Zulu; Ntshangase; Zondo and Buthelezi J. These
projects were the continuation ofland reform initiatives which occurred before the new political
dispensation. These tribal authorities approached the Department of Land Affairs as landless
Amakhosi. Initial discussions were handled without reference to any legislation and officials found
themselves processing these projects using either restitution or redistribution legislations. These
pieces oflegislation are based on fundamentally different criteria and these differences were not
made clear to the beneficiary groups. This policy vacuum has resulted in a number of project
management problems and they have virtually come to a dead end.
2.1.1 KHAMBI ZULU
The land was identified for settlement as a consequence of the Ngotshe Accord. The Trust was
drawn up in,the name of the 'Khambi Zulu Tribe' of which Nkosi Zulu was made the founder.
Disputes between Nkosi Zulu (as an individual) and the Department have subsequently emerged
around the question of traditional versus individual ownership and the rights of individual land
holders within the Trust. Nkosi Zulu is disputing the need for pegging the site for individual
ownership. He is also not accepting the notion that all members of the Trust are equal. The
project has subsequently been suspended pending the outcome of the mediation process between
the Department and Nkosi Zulu.
2.1.2 BUTHELEZI T AND BUTHELEZI J
These projects also stem from the Ngotshe Accord. Two major problems have been experienced
in the process and have seriously delayed progress to the extent that the financial roll-overs that
have been made for the last four years are threatened to be called off The first problem relates
to unsuitable geographical location of the settlements given the enormous costs of servicing the
sites. Added to the fact that it features a cliff-face and a fairly inaccessible high-lying area, it was
not the land the beneficiaries believed they would be getting with the result that some of them are
unwilling to move in. There are also disputes amongst the beneficiaries as to who their legitimate
traditional leader should be. These problems have impaired the planning process and the
formulation ofan appropriate trust document
2.1.3 NTSHANGASE
This project is one of those cases that are being reported throughout the country where areas
acquired through the land reform process have been handed over to developers and private
interests in deals which seem to have no legal basis and which do not take the interests or rights
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ofbeneficiaries into account. The Department bought a farm for the Ntshangase tribe and allowed
the Inkosi to occupy the farm house before formal settlement was initiated. The Inkosi has been
struggling to complete the list ofbeneficiaries and a number of allegations around corruption have
been levelled against the Inkosi. Coupled to this problem have been differences as to who the
rightful Inkosi is, there being a number of contenders for the title. The officials using their own
discretion, and outside the existing legislation, involved His Majesty the King in an attempt to
resolve-the impasse. Instead of the King solving the issue, he claimed the farm (without any law
backing his claim) by recommending that it be used to extend his tribal authority's boundaries,
that is, Usuthu Tribal Authority. This project is accordingly on hold until a formal restitution
claim is lodged by the King in the Land Claims Commission and an alternative farm is secured
for the Ntshangase tribe.
2.1.4 ZONDO
The project was precipitated by some 70 Zondo families invading the Sapeko Estate land in the
Vryheid District. The company together with Inkosi Zondo drew up a contract which was bound
him to include the 70 families on the list of beneficiaries. The Inkosi has since reneged on this
agreement. He not only excluded the 70 families but also promised land to 900 other families, only
200 of whom have actually settled on the land, the effect being the alienation of the original 70
families (who now refuse to move off the Sapeko Land). This case directly contributes to a
perception that many traditional leaders believe that they own their communities, that they can
make decisions on their behalf, and that they can legitimately sell off the land. In the absence of
land related legislation recognising the traditional authorities in the land reform processes,
administrators did not take any action to clarify ownership of traditional authority land as well as
Trust land acquired through land reforms. This legal limbo creates the potential for an inconsistent
and incoherent administrative discretion that is subject to challenge or collapse, as is happening
in this projept. The initial intended beneficiaries are not benefiting and are becoming a problem
to the local farmer as they are not moving offthe farm. The Inkosi Zondo, together with the 'new'
beneficiaries, are able to get away with it by continuing to occupy the designated farm.
2.2 KHUMALO : UTRECHT DISTRICT, UMZINYATHI REG. COUNCIL
Nkosi Khumalo (Map 3) was identified as one of nine landless Amakhosi by the previous
government. The project was subsequently placed under the management of the Pilot Land
Reform Steering Committee. Many of the project's initial difficulties stemmed from a lack of
planning. The planning team experienced difficulty in achieving effective communication channels
with the Committee although working sessions appear to have paved the way for more open
communication. This was illustrated when beneficiaries objected to the layout that had been
agreed to by the committee, necessitating substantial revision to the layout. A 'betterment' type
layout of the settlement has been accepted in principle. The time taken for planning has seen
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discussed and there are no indications that they would be forthcoming either from the
Department ofLand Affairs or from Urnzinyathi Regional Council.
2.3 KWAXAMU MEDIATION CASE PROJECT: VRYHEID DISTRICT:
ZULULAND REGIONAL COUNCIL
This is one of the projects that did not follow the normal conventional approach as embodied,in
land redistribution procedures. The Department ofLand Affairs in Pretoria was pressurised by a
report which came out in the New York Times in the United States of America stating that about
13 families were evicted and were living next to the road between Vryheid and Louwsburg. The
evictors acted strictly according to existing laws regarding the issuing of eviction notices. Their
argument was rights-based and they were prepared to defend it even in the Constitutional Court.
The involved foreign investor was arguing a case of surety of investment - being surety of
property.
A mediated agreement was agreed upon between the representatives of the land owners and the
tenants. This agreement was expected to be implemented within strict time-frames. People living
on the side of the road needed to move as soon as possible (someone had already been killed in
an accident). The official from the Department ofLand Affairs in Pretoria obtained permission
from the then owner ofthe farm, to allow these people to move onto the farm before the sale had
gone through. The community decided that the new settlement should be located in the area close
to the tar road because of its proximity to the shop, electric power lines, etc. Unfortunately, the
Department did not mark out sites for them, and questions ofthe size of the plots was le,ft entirely
to the community to decide. As a result, people settled themselves in a sparsely, uneconomical
manner for providing services, and even settled in areas that were not initially agreed upon.
This project was centrally driven from Pretoria and even the provincial office of the Department
ofLand Affairs only got involved after the settlement had taken place. The national Department
appointed mediators and prepared quick socio-economic surveys without the slightest reference
to the provincial administration nor to the de facto local authority which is the Zululand Regional
Council. The problems that have emanated from this project varies from poverty trap settlement
to issues of NIMBY (Not In My Backyard ) syndrome from the neighbouring farms. The
beneficiaries are no longer seeing the officials of the Department of Land Affairs because the
designation was completed and the Regional Council is expected to provide after-care services.
These communities are now demanding essential services from the Zululand Regional Council.
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3. DISTINCT OBSTACLES TO OPTIMAL LAND REFORM IMPLEMENTATION
The petformance ofland reform in KwaZulu-Natal has been slower and oflower quality than was
intended ~d this section outlines a range of institutional and technical failings which need to be
addressed. Building the necessary co-operation between DLA and the provincial and local spperes
is still in its infancy. Only limited progress has been made thus far. Land reform in KwaZulu-Natal
has slowed down to unacceptable rates of delivery because DLA and the beneficiaries have to go
it almost alone.
3.1 Control and Accountability in the Bureaucracy
The issue ofcontrol in a bureaucracy is perhaps the oldest and most prevalent explanation for the
implementation problem. Whether defined as 'the problem of getting work done and securing
compliance with the government system (Wilensky, 1967) or the process by which managers
'ensure that rules are obeyed and orders followed' (Etzioni, 1964), most policy researchers
contend that the core implementation problem is essentially that of control and accountability in
the bureaucracy. This seemingly recalcitrant behaviour ofbureaucrats not carrying out instructions
from the higher authorities, originates from the leakage of authority inside the bureaucracy.
Leakage occurs because implementing officials have no precise legal framework, and each uses
his/her discretion in translating policies from above into actions undertaken lower in the hierarchy.
The Ngotshe Accord projects showed rampant bureaucrats that were operating in an environment
characterised by, on the one hand, administrative weakness of traditional authorities caused by
the fact that they had minimal support in the past. On the other hand, these traditional authorities
remained socially and politically important bodies in the processing of the applications and
subsequent implementation. These projects were therefore handled by administrators that did not
have a clear legislation to apply and the chaotic set of beneficiaries (particularly the traditional
authorities) which played a key role in initiating and shaping land reform projects.
These enormous discretionary powers that were practised by the administrators were not applied
within the framework ofexisting legislations. Hence, decisions were not consistent and powerful
traditional authorities used the imminent vacuum to secure positions of domination. Land
redistribution as it was used in these projects is not meant for securing land for landless
Amakhosi. In this instance, redistribution was used as a substitute for restitution. The traditional
leaders viewed the process as returning the land oftheir forefathers, and that is why they disputed
the notion ofindividual ownership as enshrined in the redistribution programme. The involvement
of His Majesty the King in the disputes occurred outside of the legislative framework of the
programme. Disputes are expected to be resolved by independent mediators which are expected
to follow the mediating procedures as stipulated in the Act. The beneficiary status of all involved
in the process is equal and for the officials to treat the Inkosi as a higher authority gave the wrong
impression and created all the problems that have led to these projects to either be kept on hold
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or experiencing snails progress.
It should be recognised that the RedistributionProgramme is a poor substitute for full restitution.
Resentment has arisenwithin the group which cannot understand why everyone in the community
is not being compensated. These projects were administratively treated as compensating the
Inkosi, and equal important beneficiaries were treated as subjects which was contrary to the
conditions that were laid down by the Act. What emerged from interactions with the beneficiaries
of these projects, excluding the traditional leader, was that the legislative provisions of the
Redistribution Programme was not spelt out from the initial stages of the projects. The officials
found themselves with these projects that were initiated by the old dispensation in a form of
restitution. Having no legislation to use to proceed the already started projects, they then used
their discretion in manipulating the provisions ofthe Redistribution Programme to suit the current
needs .
3.2 Discrepancy Between Macro and Micro Implementation
The macro and micro-implementation distinction is premised on the argument that macro-
implementation occurs in a 'loosely coupled ' setting and involves a multitude of policies whose
primary concern is how to execute the policy so as to cause local implementing structures to
behave in the desired way. Micro-implementation is viewed as occurring in a ' less loosely
coupled' environment, involving, mainly attempts to implement to suit local conditions and
administrative practices with minimal disruption (Morah, 1996). This argument, when placed
within the implementation of land reform in KwaZulu-Natal, resembles a substantive irrationality
from the Ministry ofLand Affairs in implementing their programmes in a manner that does not
allow flexibility and adaptation to local determinants . DLA policies do not fit the local needs and
operating procedures. The current laws are too foreign in addressing the problems associated
with former KwaZulu areas. The current laws are not addressing the needs of traditional
authorities whilst the majority ofland reform projects involve traditional authorities. Officials from
the department found themselves using the right means to achieve the wrong ends.
The important missing key elements in these projects were clear national guidelines and
procedures of maximising consistency in decision making processes. Flexibility in policy
implementation is viewed as part of a deliberate policy-wide accommodation and conflict
resolution technique . The officials were not working with the local authorities that were better
equipped to understand the conflicting dynamics ofthese projects. The Regional Councils include
representatives of traditional authorities and have standing committees that are dealing with all
issues related to traditional authority and customs. Officials were supposed to introduce their
projects at that level, explaining the provisions of the Act and how these projects were going to
be implemented. In this approach, all problems emanating from the projects are able to be tabled
at the legitimately elected body and a decision taken would then be binding even to those
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traditional authorities. A councillor from Zululand Regional Council, when interviewed about land
reform problems, mentioned that these problems are as a result of the loose structures that DLA
established in those communities without the 'blessing' of the accountable and responsible
authority.
The KwaXamu project continues to be a nightmare for the Department of Land Affairs. The
Zululand Regional Council is not providing any financial support to the project. Potable water,
sanitation and roads are the key shortages. One respondent from the community contends that the
land that has been acquired is only suitable for residential purposes. He says, economically viable
farms were left deliberately so that they should not slide towards rural slums. The community's
anger has been fuelled by the Department ofLand Affair's refusal to commit itself to refunding
the money that the community is prepared to use from its own development fund to set up an
interim infrastructure. The officials are at pains to explain its limited role and why the provision
of essential services is not their responsibility but that of local government. In the end, officials
ofthe Department ofLand Affairs have been labelled as 'sell outs' because they settled people
in an area that was not economically sustainable where they are locked in a 'poverty trap'.
3.3 Implications of Constitutional Provisions
The provisions of the Constitution severely affect the manner in which DLA enters into
partnership with provincial governments and local government bodies. The constitutional debates
feature very strongly in the discussions of agency agreements that DLA is currently negotiating
with various Regional Councils. The relations between spheres of government affect
implementation because each sphere is independent of the others within its assigned jurisdiction.
It is noted from the interactions that DLA could only hope to impose programme priorities by
buying compliance through offering incentives in the form offinancial aid. However, DLA neither
commands an unlimited supply ofincentives nor allows to budget for activities that are not withi~
its constitutional obligation (MTEF). What is happening is that local government bodies perceive
DLA incentives as constituting a constant source ofdistortion of local priorities and interests. For
example, the forum for CEO's of Regional Council resolved that they would not accept any
'unfunded mandate' and some went further by asking DLA to fund an appointment of an official
that would be responsible for the implementation of land reform.
Particular problems also arise out of the fact that this has been a centrally driven programme
which has had difficulty securing the commitment ofProvincial and Local Governments agencies
and which has r~sulted in the Department ofLand Affairs having to bear sole responsibility with
its limited capacity. The lack ofsupport from other departments can be explained by the fact that
many provincial and national government community-based programmes are also centrally driven
and provide services directly to communities without the involvement of local authorities. These
different agencies have established a variety of sectoral forums which compete with each other,
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with traditional authorities and with local government for power and resources. The Province of
KwaZulu-Natal through its White Paper on Integrated Rural Development committed itself to
rationalizing the present system of service delivery.
3.4 Clarity of Goals and Communication
In what is possibly the authentic attempt to conceptualise the implementation process as a distinct
phenomenon ofthe policy process, Hall (1998) suggested that ambiguity or contradiction in policy
goals, misunderstanding and uncertainties, is held by many researchers to be a significant part of
implementation problems. Without the guidance oflucid programme goals, DLA officials have
floundered in handling the KwaXamu project. They did not ask relevant and insightful questions
about the programme. A firm of researchers was appointed to complete socio-economic surveys
in three days. The terms ofreference left consultants with inadequate guidance, not only unaware
ofwhat behaviour is expected ofthem, but most likely to fill in the gap using their own discretion,
which has been proved to be at odds with the original intentions.
The unquestionable reality about the implementation process is that, what ever implementation
, \
difficulties it may cause, modification of the original policy goals is inevitable, if not always
desirable. Of course, the apparent shortcoming of this acceptance is that those who eventually
come to make policies are neither authorised to do so nor accountable for them. What is
important though, is that, this inevitable change should occur in a supportive environment, not
just a neutral one, so that responsible implementing agents would be held accountable. An official
from DLA defended their direct communication with local communities, by saying that, they are
trying to avoid difficulties that can arise from having too many actors of different vertical and
horizontal levels in the process and the resulting blurring oflines of authority. In this view, the
major explanation for the implementation problem is failure on the part of implementing officials
to overcome their natural resistance to change and to develop enthusiasm and widespread
acceptance for the dynamics affecting institutional development.
3.5 Ration~1 Comprehensive Approach
The Redistribution Programme is implemented through a process that can be easily clljl.ssified as
an outdated rational planning paradigm. The chronological five steps starts from the identification
ofthe beneficiaries and the establishment of a Trust or Communal Property Association (CPA),
development priorities must be determined followed by land use visioning and the identification
ofland. Pre-planning then ensues, involving more detailed conceptual planning which is followed
by preparation ofbusiness plan. Designation is only supposed to take place when there is proven
institutional capacity to manage the project, and the beneficiaries are fully briefed, informed, and
prepared to take over the land and the responsibility for sustained development thereon. What
is missing in this linear equation is a clearly defined role and responsibility for the Municipality.
The exclusive interactions between the beneficiaries and DLA has been the main cause of planning
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problems in the Khumalo Tribal Authority project. The DLA's approach assumed that local
people are a means to an end and are capable to make far reaching decisions without referring to
anyone outside the process.
The land reform as implemented in this Province, has tended to generate projects reflecting
serious policy vacuum in terms of involving the community structures in decision making. The
location of projects has often been determined by the historical land and kinship links of
beneficiary groups, and by political consideration. This empirical observation shows the need for
DLA to work within the legitimately elected structures to blend their planning process. This
requirement is particularly discouraging in projects that are required to deliver in a short space
oftime. However, with the diverse needs of beneficiaries and current weak local institutions for
checks and balances, the truth is that public participation in decision making can be side-stepped
without any serious consequences for the legitimacy of the responsible politicians. Therefore, the
participation process ultimately amounts to no more than a nuisance to immediate policy action
in which both the beneficiaries and elected councillors have a common stake, not delaying for
such ever recurring and structural reasons such as group wrangling. This situation is more
desperate for local representatives, whose ultimate worth and legitimacy with the people is not
judged by the quality of the participation process, but rather by the concrete benefits conferred
and how expeditiously those benefits were achieved.
This suggestion is not advocating that DLA should manipulate the process by involving local
representatives but the intention is to emphasise that the process that is driven by the legitimate
local leaders that stand a chance of achieving results quicker than anticipated. Obviously,
implementation is not conducted in a vacuum, and not to recognise this, would inevitably mean
inability to expl,ain, for instanc~, why a particular project was successful in one setting put not in
another. Hence, the postulation here that useful planning process must have a 'buy in' of the
political environment of that Municipality's area or milieu in which the land reform project is
pursued.
CONCLUSION
The discussion in this chapter centred around the anomaly posed by a centrally-driven land reform
programme which has made it difficult for DLA to secure the commitment of Provincial and
Local Governments agencies. However, it was also established that a national department has
been attempting directly to implement land redistribution projects at the local level but it is not
the sole explanation for why it has been difficult to secure the active support of other departments.
Other reasons related to line function departments failing to conceptualize how land reform will
improve their ministry's mandates.
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The illustrative eX!imples highlighted that policy principles and practices of the Land
Redistribution Programme in KwaZulu-Natal, which, along with a generalised policy criterion
for accepting projects has resulted in projects often being located in inappropriate locations. The
chief mechanism used by DLA in accepting applications (application-based) has considerably
contributed in encouraging applicants from large groups to identify land in isolated places. It was
stressed in the discussion that future applications must be evaluated within context of financial
support and commitment of the relevant Municipality.
It was argued that, apart from capacity having been undermined by fragmented and centralized
systems ofservice in the Province, it has also been compromised by the long time it has taken for
effective systems oflocal government to be instituted within the rural areas. This delay was partly
due to controversies in the Province about the role of traditional leaders in relation to local
government.
What became patently obvious from the illustrative examples of land reform projects is that the
capacity ofcommunities to organise and develop micro-level institutions for the management of
land reform projects is extremely limited. Communities have been very dependent on the
Department ofLand Affairs officials within the Province and their consultants, who have not been
able to adequately deal with the demand. However, the problem is not simply that the policy
framework has not yet succeeded in making the most of available capacity within local
government and provincial departments. This is because government has never had a truly
effective presence within the former KwaZulu areas and traditional authorities have historically
been encouraged, or at least relied on, to fulfill basic administration and governance functions.
This chapter reinforced the view that traditional authorities have exerted considerable dominance
in the projects investigated in spite of their very limited administrative and financial capacity. It
also emerged from the case studies that the very weak administrative and financial position of
traditional authorities also militates against their carrying processes through to a conclusion and
renders them vulnerable to corruption. The implication of this view is that DLA is compelled to
reach concessions with relevant Municipalities so that traditional leader's problems can be handled
by responsible authorities and allow a legitimately local structures to own the process of
implementing land reform in KwaZulu-NataI.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVING INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
FOR IMPLEMENTING LAND REFORM
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has argued that it is vital that the relationship between and wit~n all spheres of
government departments in relation to the implementation of land reform be clearly spelt out.
The argument ofdeveloping a matching understanding of the central issues involved in effective
implementation ofland reform in KwaZulu Natal was based on making institutional development
a central concern ofunresponsive and uncoordinated land reform processes. Particular problems
arise because the land reform process has been a centrally driven programme which has had
difficulty in securing the commitment of provincial and local government departments, This has
resulted in the Department of Land Affairs having to bear almost sole responsibility for land
reform with its very limited resources. What compounded the problem is that other national as
well as provincial departments are still centrally driven and supply services directly to local
communities without making reference to other departments, and in some instances, to respective
. local authorities. The resultant situation has been that different competing sectoral provision of
services have mushroomed which became a rich source for poor budgetary coordination and
entrenching unnecessary bureaucratic cleavages between departments involved in the delivery of
land reform process.
It has been shown that since the inception of the new Constitution, the implementation of land
reform is intimately related to budgetary portfolio functions ofDepartment ofLand Affairs. This
Department which has failed to network with those spheres of government departments that are
assigned with. service delivery budgetary portfolio functions. It also became clear from the
discussion that it is necessary to understand the state, the market and civil organisations as
historically constructed institutions whose relation to one another changes over time. The didactic
analysis ofthe historical development of land reform in South Africa reflects policy emphasis that
have been redirected from market to state, back to market and to civil organisations which came
with the introduction of the new political dispensation. This refocussing is in part an outcome of
the development failures of each institution. However, none of these institutions are capable of
stimulating development on its own.
In short, there is no 'one best way' to achieve effective implementation of land reform because
the capacity and willingness of authorities to act are largely determined by the balance of power
(Constitution) within and beyond the institutions concerned. However, this dissertation did not
purport to provide a panacea of the problems of integrated land reform process, instead, it
articulated t~ose problem are~s and developed a matching understanding ofpolicy-makin~and
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administrative framework that severely impacts on the land reform process. Hence, the following
policy considerations serve as a contribution to further research of effective implementation of
land reform in South Africa.
1. RECONCILING FRAGMENTATION OF RESPONSmILITY FOR FINANCING
PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION
In KwaZulu-Natal, the co-ordination of Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)
principles and elements ofProvincial Growth and Development Strategy (pGDS) have viewed
development planning as consisting ofa process that starts with information gathering and ending
with budget. The process is divided into strategic and operational components. Business planning
is also viewed as a process, commencing with an analysis of the external environment and ending
with the formulation of budgets. This process is also divided into strategic and operational
elements. What is not happening though, is effective interaction with national departments such
as DLA, so that specific sector budgetary needs can be accommodated. The Province has ideally
finalised its budget for the next three years (1999 - 2001) without each department budgeting for
any support services that might be required for settlements emanating from land reform process.
The implications are that the current land reform projects are unlikely to receive any financial
support from the provincial departments.
The only option available for DLA is to negotiate with local authorities and reach an agreement
with each local authority that they should make provisions in their budgets for post tr'lnsfer
support. Indications are that funds can be made available from the Inter-Governmental Grant
000). This is an enormous task for both DLA and municipalities because they are both expected
to clearly define the needs of the land reform projects, explore linkages between the processes,
and prepare projections for the requirements of each project. This scenario calls for more
interaction and transparent processes between DLA and Municipalities. The existing projects can
be regarded as failures because they are characterised by sole budget coming from DLA and
without any networking with other government departments to provide financial support for post-
transfer needs. Perhaps the new requirements of the MTEF and its emphasis on translating
development strategies into budgets would be used by DLA to bargain for more co-operation with
Municipalities.
For future project applications, it is consequently important not only to ask questions whether the
land needs ofthe beneficiaries are likely to be addressed, but also to ascertain the financial support
and commitment of the Municipality for these projects. In this regard, DLA must ensure that a
formal resolution has been taken by the Regional Council in accepting the project. The Regional
Council should make it clear that the project is in line with the land use needs as prepared in the
regional development plan and particularly at the sub-regional level. Lastly, it must be ascertain
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that post-transfer support is budgeted for and will satisfy the future needs of the beneficiaries.
2. INTEGRATING LAND REFORM PROGRAMME WITH DEVELOPMENT
PLANNING PROCESS I
The assessment of illustrative case studies of land reform in KwaZulu-Natal showed a typical
catalogue of amorphous constraints that impinge upon effective implementation, placing the
policies beyond the reach of systematic empirical scrutiny and, thus, clearly demonstrating the
potential danger of such pursuits. The current approach not only reflects something about the
implementation problems itself, but points to the need to develop more integrated development
planning that simplify the conceptual mess and can apply in actual research situations. For
example, DLA should cooperate with the Province in developing a Provincial land reform
strategy as a way of identifying different land reform constituencies within the Province and of
developing appropriate projects for addressing their needs. This approach would provide the base
within which interests and commitments of different service providers might be secured.
This view is in line with the recommendations of the White Paper on Integrated Rural
Development where it is stressed that DLA's participation in the preparation of the Development
Plans would assist DLA to identify and provide land reform constituencies within the Province
and develop appropriate criteria and projects for addressing their needs. The inclusion ofland
reform in the Development Plan would mean that Regional Councils are part of the process and
development would be done in a more coordinated manner.
In this regard, the following questions are relevant in aligning the land reform programmes with
regional planning process: Has the Regional Council agreed to support the application ? Does the
application conform with sub-regional and regional planning already completed by the Regional
Council? Is the Regional Council prepared to budget for the future needs of the applicant?
Similarly, the criteria for determining whether to proceed with a project and to set pre-conditions
for taking ~ Project further is crucial. These criteria relate to the role of DLA in assessing
applications before being tabled to the executive committee of the relevant responsible auth~rity.
Typical questions to probe are the following: Have jurisdictional boundaries been clearly defined?
What type ofland use will result? Are there historical boundary disputes? Is it possible to identify
what the actual nature of the land need is? Does the legal entity suit the type of projects?
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3. CONCEPTUALISING MICRO-POLITICAL ISSUES IMPACTING ON
INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF LAND REFORM DEVELOPMENT
The discussion in chapter six argued that traditional authorities have been able to exert dominance
with land reform projects because traditional authorities have managed to provide critical land
resources for the rural poor which have not been readily available through the state or through
other sources. What is clearly noticeable is the policy vacuum that has been created by excluding
traditional authorities role in all land reform programmes. The current legislation did not make
provision for the role of traditional leaders and implementing agencies found themselves using
their inconsistent discretion. The case studies have demonstrated that the nature of the land
reform process by which the projects are produced is essential in understanding the institutions
involved. Hence, the need for conceptualising land reform process is crucial in representing a
socially constructed and shared understanding created in the community.
The effective involvement ofrelevant authorities as stipulated in the PDA was further concretised
by the complex nature of problems related to traditional authorities. The authorities such as
Regional Council (represented by traditional leaders) are better positioned to handle conflicts that
are negatively affecting the land reform projects. There have been cases where conflict has arisen
from those loyal to the traditional authority and those who do not see themselves as belonging to
it. DLA officials have struggled in mediating these conflicts without the involvement of either the
relevant provincial department or the Regional Council.
4. CREATION OF INTERACTIVE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT
It is essential that the academy learn how information functions in the practice of implementing
land reform projects, both for normative purposes - to define practices that are ethical and
effective, and for analytical purposes - to understand and explain how and why plans and policies
are made (Innes, 1998). The DLA monthly reports (Land Infa) on land reform projects made
reference to the fact that many planners involved in the process are learning by doing and they
often have little relevant preparation from their professional education. This is an enormous
challenge that is facing all those that are involved in the implementation ofland reform projects.
That is why the discussion on chapter five honed a concept of communicative rationality as the
instrumental use ofshared knowledge that is essential to produce desired outcomes. This implies
that, as the web of communication involves all the participants, the participants became more
interested in it, the terms of discourse within and outside the agency begin to be challenged,
questioned and changed. This imminent need is crucial in this dispensation where communities
have woken up to express their discontent and alienation against a system which has failed to live
up to their aspirations.
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The proposed communicative rationality concept questions the conventional interpretation of the
of the word 'empowerment'. This concept is loaded with meaning and associations. It was
deduced from the land policy that empowerment is sometimes used as individual psychological
construct synonymous with self-esteem, self-actualization or self-reliance. However, to be
empowered is more than being confident. At a minimum, it also implies the knowledge, skills and
resources to accomplish some objective (in this instance, a more viable self sustaining land reform
project). What this implies is that government departments should initiate land reform projects
that would first empower the officials to understand influential community dynamics whilst at the
same time creating conditions in which communities/individuals can acquire the requisite skills,
knowledge and resources. The ends of empowerment should therefore be measured against its
impact to individuals rather than in collective terms. This plasticity of the concept will make it
useful to locate empowerment at the centre of equation where communicative rationality benefits
both the authorities and the communities.
5. DECENTRALISED ONE STOP LAND REFORM IMPLEMENTATION
The extensive discussion on chapter four centred around the notion that the new political
dispensation and its Constitution created a fundamentally new legal and institutional environment
within which delivery ofland services must take place. The Constitution located land matters and
legislative powers regarding land matters as a competence ofNational Government and political
accountability for land affairs was assigned to the Minister of Land Affairs. Impli~it i~ this
constitutional provision was that the department would embark on a programme of policy and
legislative reform that would be unambiguous and naturally coincide with society's needs and
preferences. However, the immense practical problems experienced on the ground showed the
policy failures and practical experiences (as illustrated on chapter six) that have brought these
assumptions under critical review.
It was strongly suggested in chapter five that the only sustainable land reform delivery system is
a one stop land reform process to be established at the local sphere ofgovernment. In making this
suggestion, it was emphasised that this must not be construed as negating the role ofNational
Department ofLand Affairs in carrying out key land functions. This suggestion is based on the
discussions from chapter four, five and six where it was conspicuous that policy realisation and
implementation is more dependent on the bureaucracies within implementing institutions and the
social and political interests among which these institutions are working, rather than on policies
sanctioned and formulated at a national level. The local sphere of government was. the;efore
identified as better located to introduce an ongoing planned intervention that would be socially
constructed through a negotiated process and not simply the execution of an already specified
plan ofaction with foregone concluded outcomes.
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This policy proposal is in line with a contemporary approach in which local governments, with
active participation of the constituencies, take initiative and responsibility for the actions
conducive to their sustainable capacity development. The practical implementation problems as
outlined in chapter six concretised the notion of linking land reform with reliable accountability
mechanisms (politicians and administrators) that have sufficient local mandate, powers and
resources to play an adequate role in bridging the gap between traditional and government
institutions. This would entail the state promoting procedural rather than substantive and precise
legislation. Such an approach would facilitate flexibility and diversity in the institutional formation,
which would accommodate provision offormal rule enforcement procedures to back those which
may prove inefficient at lower levels; but without imposing rigid and prescriptive legislation.
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